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BODY AND SOUL: EQUALITY, PREGNANCY, 
AND THE UNITARY RIGHT TO ABORTION 
Jennifer S. Hendricks1 
Abstract 
This Article explores equality-based arguments for abortion 
rights, revealing both their necessity and their pitfalls. It first uses the 
narrowness of the “health exception” to abortion regulations to show 
why equality arguments are needed—because our legal tradition's 
conception of liberty is based on male experience, and we have no 
theory of basic human rights grounded in women's reproductive 
experiences. Next, however, the Article shows that equality 
arguments, although necessary, can undermine women's reproductive 
freedom because they require that pregnancy and abortion be 
analogized to male experiences. The result is that equality arguments 
focus on either the bodily or the social aspect of pregnancy, to the 
detriment of the other. Most recently, for example, Jack Balkin has 
argued that there are “two rights” to abortion, one based in the right 
to bodily integrity and one based in the right to avoid motherhood. 
This is the wrong way to theorize pregnancy. The body-focused 
arguments fail to resonate with the reasons most women seek 
abortions, and the role that pregnancy and abortion play in women’s 
lives. The burden-of-motherhood arguments imply a sunset clause on 
abortion rights and lend credibility to arguments for a right to “male 
abortion.” 
This division between the body and the social suggests that 
women’s liberty can be protected only by breaking it into pieces that 
have analogs in men’s experiences. When men are the norm, 
women’s rights become derivative. Women’s rights would stand 
more firmly on their own footing. The Article proposes a different 
framework for theorizing pregnancy. While this understanding of 
pregnancy could form the basis for yet more comparative equality 
arguments, abortion is better understood through a liberty framework 
developed directly from women’s experiences. 
                                                 
1
 Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law 
(jsh@tennessee.edu); J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A. Swarthmore College. 
HENDRICKS, BODY AND SOUL 
 
 
2 
 
 
Introduction .....................................................................................3 
I. The Intuition About Equality and Abortion.............................5 
II.   Bodies and Burdens: Two Takes on Abortion as an Equality 
Right.......................................................................................12 
A. Body-Focused Arguments: Arguing Equality When 
Women’s Liberty Is Not Enough....................................13 
1. The Health Exception: Liberty Is Not Enough .......13 
  2. The Good Samaritan Argument ..............................22 
B. Burdens of Motherhood Arguments: An Incomplete 
Account of Reproductive Rights ....................................26 
  1. Version One:  Women in a Man’s World ...............26 
  2. Version Two:  Women in a Sexist World ...............29 
III. The Constitutional Status of Pregnancy.................................35 
A. Pregnancy and Parenthood .............................................36 
B. Pregnancy as Parenting: A Dangerous Path? .................38 
1. Abortion and Mothering..........................................38 
2. Abortion Decisions as Parental Decisions ..............40 
IV. The Dialectic of Equality .......................................................44 
 A. Some New Comparisons ................................................44 
  1. Mandatory Visitation ..............................................45 
  2. Stockholm Syndrome..............................................46 
 B. Affirmative Rights..........................................................48 
 C. The Limits of Equality....................................................49 
Conclusion .....................................................................................51 
HENDRICKS, BODY AND SOUL 
 
 
3 
 
If men could get pregnant, 
abortion would be a sacrament. 
—Florynce Kennedy2 
But they cannot,3 so legal and political arguments about abortion 
rights seek out ways to compare a pregnant woman to a man and 
thereby make her situation comprehensible to liberal legal doctrine. 
Such comparisons become especially important when abortion is 
claimed not just as a privacy right but as a matter of equality. A 
recurring debate since Roe v. Wade concerns the relative merits of 
privacy and equality as theoretical explanation and doctrinal 
justification for reproductive rights.4 This Article demonstrates a 
paradox of the equality approach: Equality arguments are necessary 
in order to establish women’s liberty rights in a legal tradition based 
on male experience. However, because of the need for comparisons, 
equality arguments also undermine the long-term goal of developing 
a theory of liberty based on female experience rather than defining 
women’s liberty as derivative of men’s. 
Equality arguments for the right to abortion are typically either 
body-focused or motherhood-focused. Some commentators have 
                                                 
2
 Gloria Steinem, The Verbal Karate of Florynce Kennedy, Esq., MS. MAGAZINE 
(Mar. 1973) (quoting Kennedy’s verbal statement). 
3
 Recent press reports of a pregnant man notwithstanding, this Article treats 
pregnancy as a female experience because pregnancy and the capacity for 
pregnancy are central to the cultural and legal construction of gender. “Men are 
free to develop the technology to become mothers.” BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, 
RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL 
SOCIETY 257 (1989). In addition, because this Article focuses on abortion rights, 
vulnerability to accidental pregnancy is important. 
4
 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 
(1992) (setting out a foundational equality argument for abortion rights); Catharine 
A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 
1326-28 (1991) (advocating an equality approach); Ruth Colker, Equality Theory 
and Reproductive Freedom, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 99 (1994) (same); Ruth Colker, 
An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: 
Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 324 n.1, 356, 361 (1991) ( 
defending the equality approach and providing an illustration of a non-essentialist 
equal protection argument for abortion rights); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the 
Constitution, 132 U. PENN. L. REV. 955 (1984) (proposing an equal protection 
standard); Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: 
Reflections on Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
Pol’y 419 (1995) (defending the privacy approach); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The 
Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women’s Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137 
(advocating a dual approach). 
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even suggested that there may be two distinct rights to abortion: one 
based on the right to bodily integrity, and one based on privacy for 
intimate family choices.5 My thesis is that such bifurcation is exactly 
the wrong approach. The division is not based on women’s 
experience of pregnancy but on the need to make that experience fit 
into existing categories. True equality—which includes a non-
derivative theory of women’s liberty—requires that reproductive 
rights be theorized without reducing pregnancy to component parts 
and shoe-horning it into doctrines developed without women in 
mind. Pregnancy is a complex and multifaceted process, but it is 
nonetheless a unitary experience. A woman’s right to liberty during 
pregnancy is similarly unitary. 
Part I of this Article summarizes the political basis for the 
connection between sex equality and abortion rights. Part II reviews 
the strengths and weaknesses of the two main types of equality 
arguments for abortion rights. This critique leads to the conclusion 
that the bifurcation between body-focused arguments and burdens-
of-motherhood arguments is itself a fatal flaw. Part III argues that 
pregnancy should be recognized as an archetypal parental 
relationship that incorporates a bodily relationship and a social one. 
This recognition would build on Supreme Court precedent that uses 
pregnancy as the baseline for a constitutional definition of 
parenthood. Analogies that take the female experience as the baseline 
can use equal protection analysis to construct a vision of fundamental 
rights that puts women at the center. Part IV sketches two possible 
equal protection arguments from this perspective but shows that the 
persistent need to compare women’s experiences to men’s ultimately 
undermines a more comprehensive approach to reproductive 
freedom. The Article concludes that equality arguments are a 
necessary tool for “getting there” from here but that they must be 
used with caution and awareness that they are stepping stones, not 
destinations, in the struggle for women’s human rights. A new effort 
to theorize fundamental human rights, which feminists are just 
beginning,6 is needed. 
                                                 
5
 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 
340-52 (2007) (describing the “two rights to abortion”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 222 (discussing “Splitting the Woman’s 
Right in Two”) (1992). 
6
 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality: Still Illusive After All These 
Years, in SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND GENDER _ (Joanna Grossman & Linda 
McClain, eds., forthcoming 2009) (proposing “that one way to render equality less 
illusive is to move beyond gender and build a more comprehensive framework on 
the concept of universal human vulnerability”); Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing 
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I.  THE INTUITION ABOUT EQUALITY AND ABORTION 
Seventy-seven percent of anti-abortion leaders are men.   
One hundred percent of them will never be pregnant. 
—Planned Parenthood advertisement 
As a matter of doctrine, abortion rights are part of the right to 
privacy, an unenumerated right protected by the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.7 In Roe v. Wade,8 it was 
not entirely clear to whom the privacy belonged. The leading 
feminist criticism of Roe has long been that it reads like a manifesto 
for doctors’ rights rather than women’s, suggesting that whether to 
abort is the doctor’s call even when the reasons are non-medical. For 
example, Roe concludes, 
Th[is] decision vindicates the right of the physician to 
administer medical treatment according to his professional 
judgment up to the points where important state interests 
provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to 
those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is 
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic 
responsibility for it must rest with the physician.9 
                                                                                                                 
Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Consideration of Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371, 
380, 381-90 (1995) (sketching “a theory of the abortion decision and its 
relationship to selfhood”). 
7
 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
1626-27 (2007) (applying Fourteenth Amendment precedent to a federal restriction 
on abortion, thereby implicitly invoking Fifth Amendment). 
8
 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
9
 Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66. See also id. at 153 (stating that medical, psychological, 
and social concerns are all “factors the woman and her responsible physician 
necessarily will consider in consultation”); id. at 163 (stating that before viability, 
abortion decision should be made by “the attending physician, in consultation with 
his patient”). In fairness to the Roe Court, some of these statements seem to be 
directed at state claims to be restricting abortion for the sake of women’s medical 
safety. The Court may have emphasized the doctor’s clinical judgment in part to 
rebut such claims. While the paternalism is rank, Roe need not necessarily be read 
to designate the doctor as the primary constitutional decision-maker. But see Erin 
Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 85-86 (1995) (“Under Roe, 
the physician … is constitutionally required to lead the decisionmaking process.”). 
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In this respect, Roe might truly have been the progeny of Lochner v. 
New York,10 protecting doctors’ right to contract to perform medical 
services rather than women’s right to control their pregnancies. 
Over the years, however, the Supreme Court came to see the 
choice as belonging to the pregnant woman. Justice Blackmun, the 
author of Roe, tentatively claimed the ground of women’s equality 
rights in a 1986 decision, then staked it firmly in 1989, in a 
passionate dissent from the first major decision undercutting Roe.11 
In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,12 the Court’s partial affirmation of Roe grounded the abortion 
right squarely in women’s liberty. Ironically, this shift from doctors’ 
rights to women’s rights accompanied a substantial curtailment of 
the scope of the right.13 Casey also acknowledged the increasingly 
prevalent view that abortion rights were linked to sex equality.14 
The intuition that abortion rights are part of sex equality has 
been elaborated in both political and legal forms. Second-wave 
feminists15 assumed, and sometimes articulated, a strong connection 
between abortion rights and sex equality.16 Although feminists 
                                                 
10
 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down protective labor laws because they interfered 
with freedom of contract). 
11
 See Thornburgh v. Amer. Col. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
772 (1986) (“Any other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central 
part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all.”); Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537-38 (1989) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I fear for the liberty and equality of the 
millions of women who have lived and come of age in the sixteen years since Roe 
was decided.”). 
12
 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
13
 Casey replaced strict scrutiny of abortion restrictions with the “undue burden” 
analysis. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78; see also PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, 
NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES  209 (1998) 
(stating that one objective of the Casey plurality was to “reduce the level of 
constitutional protection for pregnant women seeking autonomy in the 
management of their pregnancies”). 
14
 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850, 856, 860, discussed infra, notes __ and 
accompanying text. 
15
 Occurring between 1918 and 1968, second-wave feminism “was concerned with 
social reform (such as free school meals for poor children, and health care for poor 
women) and ‘revolution’ in the private sphere: the right to contraception, the end 
of the sexual double standard, and so on.” SARA DELAMONT, FEMINIST SOCIOLOGY 
2 (2003). 
16
 See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their 
Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, (hereinafter Siegel, 
Symposium), 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 826-28 (2007) (stating that Second Wave 
feminists connected abortion to equality); Law, Rethinking, at 972 (noting that 
abortion was a central focus of the second wave). 
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strategically severed the abortion debate from the debate over the 
Equal Rights Amendment,17 abortion has remained the defining, 
litmus-test issue for many advocates of women’s equality.18 
Abortion, however, has not always been embraced as a feminist 
issue. In the eighteenth century, doctors promoting the 
criminalization of abortion were the first to link abortion (and 
contraception) to equality.19 First-wave feminists20 in the United 
States expressed sympathy for women who sought abortions, but 
publicly opposed both abortion and contraception.21 The feminist 
goal of “voluntary motherhood” meant the right of married women to 
refuse sexual intercourse.22 More recently, most feminists have 
concluded that sexuality is too integral to human flourishing for the 
right to say “no”—even if always and everywhere respected—to be 
the sine qua non of women’s control over reproduction.23 Indeed, at 
times, leaders of the second wave have been criticized for focusing 
                                                 
17
 See Siegel, Symposium, at 826-28 (stating that feminists followed Roe in 
separating abortion rights from sex equality for strategic reasons). 
18
 See, e.g., Katha Pollit, Feminists for (Fetal) Life, THE NATION (Aug. 11, 2005) 
(answering “no” to the question “Can you be a feminist and be against abortion?”). 
EMILY’s List, a leading feminist political fundraising organization, has three 
requirements for the candidates it will support at all levels of government: they 
must be women, Democrats, and pro-choice. See 
www.emilyslist.org/about/mission (visited 8/14/09). 
19
 See Siegel, Reasoning, at 280-323 (describing the nineteenth-century doctors’ 
campaign to criminalize abortion); see also ROTHMAN, at 188 (“I do not believe 
that the shifting image, from mother as protector to mother as potential enemy of 
her children, represents a change in maternal behavior or protectiveness. I believe 
it represents, among other things, a response to the feminist movement. If women 
can look out for our own interests, then, some fear, perhaps we cannot be trusted to 
look out for the interests of our children.”). 
20
 “First Wave feminism, from about 1848 to 1918, focused on getting women 
rights in public spheres, especially the vote, education and entry to middle-class 
jobs such as medicine. The views of these feminists, at least as they expressed 
them in public, were puritan about sex, alcohol, dress, and behaviour.” DELAMONT, 
supra note __, at 2. 
21
 See Siegel, Reasoning, at 304-06 (stating that nineteenth century feminists 
blamed abortion on “the social conditions in which women conceived and raised 
children”). 
22
 See Linda Gordon, Voluntary Motherhood; The Beginnings of Feminist Birth 
Control Ideas in the United States, FEMINIST STUD., Winter-Spring 1973, at 5, 5 
(discussing voluntary motherhood as “an initial response of feminists to their 
understanding that involuntary motherhood and child-raising were important parts 
of woman’s oppression”). 
23
 See Siegel, Symposium, at 817 (observing that proponents of a sex equality basis 
for abortion rights generally view “sexual intimacy as a human need worthy of 
fulfillment”). 
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too narrowly on abortion rights at the expense of other goals.24 
Among those is the goal of allowing women to have children secure 
in the knowledge that they will not have to look on as poverty and 
discrimination crush those children’s bodies and spirits.25 
Some of the best evidence of the relationship between abortion 
rights and sex equality is negative evidence—not an affirmative 
account of women’s liberty but an observation that opponents of sex 
equality generally oppose abortion as well. The social practice of 
restricting abortion is closely associated with traditional attitudes 
about women’s roles and with efforts to control women’s sexuality.26 
Although concern for fetal life is the primary articulated argument 
against abortion, that concern typically either masks or works in 
tandem with prescriptions for women’s roles.27 
Feminists have long pointed out that public judgments about on 
abortion often turn on a moral judgments about the woman’s sexual 
                                                 
24
 See, e.g., Colker, Equality Theory (criticizing Laurence Tribe’s work on abortion 
as “narrowly pro-choice”); MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1318 (“The right to 
reproductive control I have in mind would include the abortion right but would not 
center on it.”.); cf. Allen, The Fix, at 454 (stating that her support for public 
funding of abortion is circumspect because “the history of slavery and medical 
abuse of women and people of color” raises concerns about “the appearance or 
reality of compulsory abortion”). 
25
 Cf. MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1295 (“[Feminist activists] have moved from a 
request to be permitted to play by the rules of the game to an understanding that 
having no say in the rules means not being permitted to play the game.”); 
ROTHMAN, at 154 (“Women who do not want a maternity experience essentially 
comparable to what men's experience with fatherhood has been may find that the 
dominant thinking in the feminist movement does not represent their concerns.”); 
Colker, An EP Analysis, at 327 (“[T]he popularity of the abortion debate is a 
reflection of the problem of essentialism because this debate chooses one issue for 
debate—abortion—and generally ignores the larger and more complex problems 
relating to reproductive health issues, of which pregnancy is only one part.”). 
26
 See Siegel, Reasoning, at 327-28 (summarizing findings from KRISTIN LUKER, 
ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD  (1984)). 
27
 See Siegel, Reasoning, at 359-62 (arguing that banning abortion in order to 
protect fetal life “entails a purely functional use of the pregnant woman,” requiring 
one to ask, “What view of women prompted the state’s decision to use them as a 
means to an end?”); see also id. at 335 (“The risk of harm to unborn life, and of 
bias against women in actions undertaken to prevent it, may each be real. To see 
how unexamined assumptions about women's obligations as mothers can shape 
fetal-protective regulation, it is necessary to consider the methods and resources 
this society employs to prevent harm to the unborn.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality 
in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion and 
Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992) (“[T]he problem lies in turning women’s 
sexuality and reproductive capacity into objects for the control and use of others.”). 
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conduct rather than on the moral status of the fetus.28 For example, 
many abortion bans may provide exceptions for cases of rape. The 
fetus that results from a rape is no less alive than any other, 
suggesting that the real concern is the woman’s culpability for 
voluntary sex. Even this characterization may be too generous: Since 
the law defines rape from the perpetrator’s perspective,29 it is more 
accurate to say that the right to abortion depends on the culpability of 
the man, not the woman. The rape exception thus represents a 
judgment about which men are entitled to have women forced to bear 
their children. 
Other justifications for abortion restrictions are similarly 
suspect. For example, in the early twenty-first century, abortion 
opponents have drawn more from some of the rhetoric of the First 
Wave, arguing that women need to be protected from abortion.30 
These arguments are based on traditional, paternalistic views that 
women should be protected from poor decisions, or from coercion, 
by eliminating their choices rather than informing and empowering 
their decisions.31 The fetus has moral status, the man has moral 
agency, and the woman remains a passive vessel. 
This resonance with traditional sex stereotypes is a hallmark of 
unconstitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause.32 Yet equal 
                                                 
28
 Roe mentioned this point. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 57 n. 54) (1973). See also 
Siegel, Reasoning, at 364; Balkin, Judgment of the Court, in WHAT ROE V. WADE 
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S 
MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 49 (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2005) (hereinafter WHAT 
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID); but see Akhil Reed Amar, Opinion 
Concurring in Roe, Dissenting in Doe, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE 
SAID, at 159 (rebutting this argument by invoking the legislature’s prerogative to 
balance competing interests). 
29
 See MacKinnon, Reflection, at 1303-04 (“Crystallizing in doctrine a norm that 
animates the rape law more generally, the defense of ‘mistaken belief of consent’ 
defined whether a rape occurred from the perspective of the accused rapist, not 
from the perspective of the victim or even based on a social standard of 
unacceptable force or of mutuality.”). 
30
 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (arguing that Congress 
should be able to restrict abortion because women’s consent may not be adequately 
informed and because they may later regret their decisions); see generally Reva B. 
Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-
Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) (documenting and 
analyzing the political use of such arguments). 
31
 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183-85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority’s paternalistic attitude toward women). 
32
 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1986) (stating that 
“generalizations” about sex differences cannot justify excluding all women from 
military academy). 
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protection arguments for reproductive rights have only barely gained 
traction in court. One reason for this failure is that courts do not 
analyze potential stereotypes behind a law until they first determine 
that the law classifies individuals on the basis of sex. “The point [is] 
to apply existing law to women as if women were citizens—as if the 
doctrine was not gendered to women's disadvantage, as if the legal 
system had no sex, as if women were gender-neutral persons 
temporarily trapped by law in female bodies.”33 Under the notorious 
holding of Geduldig v. Aillieo,34 regulation of pregnancy is deemed 
not to be sex-specific: no sex classification, hence no equal 
protection analysis.35 Because there are no pregnant men who are 
accorded greater rights than pregnant women, the doctrine largely 
fails to see an equality problem. 
In response to this doctrinal dead end, many proponents of 
reproductive rights have tried to show that pregnant women are, in 
fact, treated differently from similarly situated men. To do so, they 
have followed the example of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(“PDA”).36 The PDA overruled Geduldig in the employment context, 
declaring that pregnant women on the job must be treated the same 
as men who are similarly situated with respect to the physical 
demands of the work.37 Pregnant women are thus classified with 
other workers experiencing temporary disability. Equality arguments 
for abortion similarly seek comparisons with male experience by 
describing pregnancy at a higher level of generality.38 
Through these comparisons, feminists are reaching for a more 
affirmative account of abortion and equality. Rather than focusing on 
the impermissible motives that lie behind the restrictions, they show 
the importance of abortion rights by comparing women’s experience 
of forced pregnancy and childbirth to experiences that men can also 
have. While the comparisons often appear strained, some such 
comparisons appear to be necessary in order for abortion to be 
legally recognizable as an equality problem. 
It is revealing that an issue felt to be so central to women’s 
equality is so difficult to express in the language of constitutional 
doctrine that purports to guarantee the equal protection of the laws. 
                                                 
33
 MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1286. 
34
 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
35
 Id. at 496 n. 20. 
36
 42 U.S.C. § 2500e(k). 
37
 Id. 
38
 On the non-linearity of the paths among levels of generality, see LAURENCE 
TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1991). 
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As Catharine MacKinnon has explained, the law cannot see the sex 
discrimination in practices that are done only to women, because 
equality is violated only when there is a similarly situated man who 
is treated differently.39 To make an equality argument, one has to 
move to a higher level of abstraction, arguing, for example, that 
women and men must be accorded equal dignity as citizens.40 That 
then requires a further argument about why women’s dignity 
demands control over pregnancy.41 When the comparisons run this 
far afield, the subject under discussion is no longer equality but 
women’s autonomy and dignity. Those should not have to be 
derivative of men’s experiences. Our constitutional discourse, 
however, has no tradition defining human dignity from a female 
perspective. 42 Ultimately, we need a concept of human rights not 
that “includes” women but that comes from, is based on, and meets 
the needs of women. In the meantime, we may need the ratchet of 
equality analysis to translate women’s fundamental dignity into 
something that resembles men’s.43 When men are the baseline, 
equality analysis helps grope toward a different discourse. 
                                                 
39
 See, e..g, MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1288-89 (observing that under formal 
equality principles, where women are perceived as unlike men, “discrimination as 
a legal theory does not even come up”). 
40
 See, e.g., Balkin, Original Meaning, at 322-23. 
41
 See id. 
42
 See ROTHMAN, at 59 (“Motherhood is the embodied challenge to liberal 
philosophy, and that, I fear, is why a society founded on and committed to liberal 
philosophical principles cannot deal well with motherhood.”); Hanigsberg, 
Homologizing at 386 (“As philosopher Susan Bordo observes, ‘[O]ntologically 
speaking, the pregnant woman has been seen by our legal system as the mirror-
image of the abstract subject whose bodily integrity the law is so determined to 
protect ….’”) (quoting Susan Bordo, Are Mothers Persons? Reproductive Rights 
and the Politics of Subjectivity, in UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN 
CULTURE, AND THE BODY 79 (1993)); MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1315 (“Women 
have not been considered ‘persons’ by law very long; the law of persons arguably 
does not recognize the requisites of female personhood yet.”). 
     Much of the legal academic literature about abortion is by men because Roe v. 
Wade—like Brown v. Board of Education—is an important test case and proving 
ground for interpretive theories. See, e.g., Balkin, Original Meaning; Sunstein, 
Neutrality. Thus, even the most empathetic and well-intentioned treatments of 
abortion in the legal literature can sound like any other group of men defining their 
culture by how they treat their women. 
43
 Cf. Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, 
and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1323 
(2004) (“The Court [in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)] uses the Equal 
Protection Clause as a kind of rights ratchet to expand the universe of people 
entitled to exercise the liberty interest established by Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965)].”); compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (rejecting 
woman’s privacy challenge to forced sterilization) with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
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II.  BODIES AND BURDENS: TWO TAKES ON 
ABORTION AS AN EQUALITY RIGHT 
Roe stands at an intersection of two lines of decisions. 
—Planned Parenthood v. Casey44 
As the Court explained in Casey, the right to abortion fits 
squarely within two intersecting categories of protected rights: the 
right to bodily integrity and the right to privacy in making intimate 
family choices.45 Instead of making the right to abortion doubly 
strong, however, that intersectionality illustrates the degree to which 
reproductive freedom must be justified in terms of traditional 
categories that emerged from men’s concerns.46 
Despite the protection afforded by Roe/Casey, the doctrinal 
limits of the abortion right illustrate that women’s liberty is shaky 
ground for a fundamental right. Women’s need to control their 
bodies and lives has to be buttressed by specific comparisons to 
men’s experiences. Otherwise, the harms of forced maternity are 
invisible. 
Such comparisons tend to emphasize either the bodily 
imposition of forced pregnancy or the disproportionate social 
burdens of motherhood. Each approach has its own pitfalls, mainly 
stemming from the fact that each emphasizes one aspect of 
pregnancy to the detriment of the other. While each kind of 
comparison illuminates part of why reproductive rights are central to 
women’s equality, both suffer from the fact that they are driven by 
the need to justify women’s liberty in terms of men’s experiences.  
                                                                                                                 
U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down sterilization on equal protection grounds); but see 
MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1313 (“It has been held illegal to sterilize a male 
prisoner but legal to sterilize a mentally disabled woman.”). 
44
 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992). 
45
 Id. 
46
 Cf. Kimberlé  Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, 
1989 U. CHI. L.F. 139 (demonstrating that people who are discriminated against 
because of a combination of marked characteristics receive less protection under 
civil rights laws). 
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A. BODY-FOCUSED ARGUMENTS: ARGUING EQUALITY 
WHEN WOMEN’S LIBERTY IS NOT ENOUGH 
Bodily integrity is a fundamental privacy right and an important 
aspect of the right to abortion.47 Privacy-based abortion doctrine 
most expressly acknowledges the right to bodily integrity through the 
“health exception.” The health exception is a limited right to medical 
self-defense and a narrow caveat to the state’s power to regulate all 
abortions and to ban post-viability abortions.48 A diminished right to 
bodily integrity is thus incorporated into the health exception from 
the outset: it is a right of survival, not autonomy.49 The doctrinal 
evolution of the health exception thus illustrates how a liberty right 
can be weakened when applied to women as a special case. This 
weakening creates the need for additional arguments, especially 
equality arguments. 
Under the rubric of equality, feminists have constructed broader 
arguments that focus on the body but not necessarily on heightened 
medical risk. To go beyond the health exception, these arguments 
appeal to the general principle that the government cannot force one 
person to assist another physically: abortion bans wrongly and 
uniquely force pregnant women to be Good Samaritans. These 
equality arguments are necessary because women’s bodily integrity 
is not enough, standing alone, to justify protection under the 
prevailing legal regime. 
1. The Health Exception: Women’s Liberty Is Not Enough 
The health exception, taken seriously, could do as much as 
Casey does to protect the right to choose an abortion. The fact that it 
does not reveals the limits of a pure autonomy or pure privacy 
approach to abortion rights in a legal system not premised on 
women’s full humanity. 
Casey held that a pregnant woman has the right to decide 
whether to have an abortion before the fetus is capable of living 
outside the womb.50 Even after the point of viability, a woman is 
entitled to seek an abortion if continuation of the pregnancy threatens 
                                                 
47
 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) 
(aligning the abortion right with precedent protecting the right to bodily integrity). 
48
 See id. at 846 (summarizing the core aspects of the abortion right). 
49
 See Siegel, Reasoning, at 365 (arguing that health exceptions define a woman’s 
liberty interest as an interest in “brute survival”). 
50
 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (reaffirming Roe’s holding that a woman has the right to 
choose an abortion before viability). 
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her life or health.51 An immediate threat to life or health will also 
entitle a woman to an exemption from most restrictions on pre-
viability abortion, such as a waiting period or parental consent 
requirement.52 
The idea of a health exception, however broad or narrow, 
incorporates an implicit distinction between normal pregnancy and 
the complications of pregnancy. That distinction renders invisible the 
inherent risks and physical burdens of all pregnancies. 
Casey’s protection of women’s health is limited by this implicit 
distinction. At issue in Casey was Pennsylvania’s definition of a 
medical emergency sufficient to waive restrictions such as parental 
consent, waiting periods, and post-viability prohibition of abortion: 
That condition which, on the basis of the physician's good 
faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition 
of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion 
of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will 
create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment 
of a major bodily function.53 
 The only challenge to this provision even considered in Casey was 
that it failed to cover three specific conditions. Those three 
conditions develop gradually; the statute thus appeared to require 
postponing the abortion until the inevitable moment of crisis. The 
Supreme Court upheld the statute by reading out the immediacy 
requirement and thus declaring those three conditions to be covered. 
It retained the requirement of “substantial and irreversible” 
consequences.54 Casey’s health exception thus protects not a 
woman’s health but her interest in “brute survival.”55 
                                                 
51
 Id. (confirming “the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the 
law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or 
health”). 
52
 Id. at 880 (stating that an “essential holding of Roe forbids a State to interfere 
with a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion procedure if continuing her 
pregnancy would constitute a threat to her health”). The text says “most” rather 
than “all” because of Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a ban 
on a particular abortion procedure, without a health exception). 
53
 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1990), quoted in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (emphasis added). 
54
 Casey, 505 U.S. at 880. 
55
 Siegel, Reasoning, at 365 (discussing health exception in Utah abortion law). In 
2007, the legal academy was largely appalled to learn that “permanent impairment 
of a significant body function” had been adopted as part of the official U.S. 
definition of torture. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memo. for 
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dep’t of Defense Re: Military 
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The high threshold for the Casey health exception plays to a 
supposed distinction between good reasons for having an abortion 
and frivolous ones. In Roe v. Wade, the dissent complained, 
At the heart of the controversy … are those recurring 
pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or 
health of the mother. . . . [The majority] values the 
convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more 
than the life or potential life of the fetus . . . . 56 
Even setting aside the very large gap between danger to health and 
convenience, whim, or caprice, there is no such thing as a pregnancy 
that poses “no danger whatsoever” to a woman’s health.57 
Every pregnancy has the potential to become a complicated 
pregnancy over the course of nine months of dramatic physiological 
changes. The mere fact of pregnancy increases the woman’s chances 
                                                                                                                 
Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the U.S, at 37-38. (Mar. 
14, 2003). Although the OLC Memo was retracted, Casey is good law. The Casey 
health exception thus protects pregnant women from being forced by the state to 
endure physical consequences that the George W. Bush Administration would 
define as torture. Unlike members of al Qaeda, pregnant women are not necessarily 
protected from psychological harm. See Voinovich v. Women’s Med. Prof. Corp., 
523 U.S. 1036 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of certiorari 
on the question whether mental health must be part of any health exception). 
56
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 219, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
57
 Even supporters of abortion rights can overlook the risks of normal pregnancy. 
For example, in Abortion and Original Meaning, Jack Balkin recognized that 
abortion bans “require a woman’s body to undergo the strains of pregnancy and the 
difficulties of childbirth without her consent.” Balkin, Original Meaning, at 323. 
Yet, when he articulated the right to abortion, he argued that there are two distinct 
rights to abortion: The first is a right to bodily integrity that works out to be 
equivalent to the health exception. The second is a right to avoid motherhood, 
which focuses on post-birth responsibilities that are disproportionately borne by 
women. Id. at 342-43. Lost in this division are the risks and burdens of normal 
pregnancy. Dawn Johnsen pointed out this omission in her comment on Balkin’s 
article. See Dawn Johnsen, The Progressive Political Power of Balkin’s “Original 
Meaning”, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 423-24 (2008).  In reply, Balkin amended 
his description of the second right to abortion to include the burdens of pregnancy. 
See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constituional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427, 528 (2008). This amendment, however, undermines his equality 
justification for the second right, which blames societal discrimination for making 
women bear the disproportionate burden of child-rearing. See id. at 529 
(“Nevertheless, the second right is premised on a background of social 
expectations and technological possibilities.”). Society cannot be blamed for men’s 
immunity from unintended pregnancy. This is not to say that Balkin is dismissive 
of that burden in the fashion of the Roe dissent, only that the burden is often and 
easily overlooked. 
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of death or long-term detriment health.58 Once pregnancy has begun, 
abortion is statistically safer than carrying to term until well into the 
second trimester.59 On top of the risk of complications is the physical 
burden of normal pregnancy itself. Many other symptoms—nausea, 
vomiting, back pain, sleeplessness—would not ordinarily be 
considered “healthy” but are within the range of “normal” for a 
pregnant woman.60 At a minimum, carrying a pregnancy to term 
entails a 100% risk of either severe uterine contractions and painful 
dilation of the cervix, or major abdominal surgery. Childbirth is a 
journey to the boundary between life and death, a place where a lot 
can go wrong. 
If “health” referred to the likely medical outcomes of early 
abortion as compared to continued pregnancy, the health exception 
would swallow Casey. But the perspective of the Roe dissent—that 
the normal risks of pregnancy are women’s lot—remains enshrined 
in Casey‘s health exception. Although Casey acknowledged that a 
pregnant woman “is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to 
pain” and that her sacrifice “ennobles her,” those sufferings were 
defined out of the health exception.61 
Before Casey, the Supreme Court had at least suggested that a 
woman’s right to defend her health was more complete. Even before 
Roe, in United States v. Vuitch,62 the Court had construed a statutory 
health exception to include a broad concept of mental health.63 After 
Roe, in Colautti v. Franklin,64 the Court strongly suggested that the 
state could not require “trade-offs” between fetal and maternal 
health.65 Although it ultimately resolved Colautti on vagueness 
grounds, the Court was sharply critical of the possibility that a 
particular abortion technique had to be “indispensable” rather than 
                                                 
58
 See Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 
YALE L.J. 639, 640 n. 9 (1986) (collecting statistics and calculating that as of 1983, 
abortion was safer than childbirth until at least week 21); see also Council on 
Scientific Affairs, American Medical Ass'n, Induced Termination of Pregnancy 
Before and After Roe v. Wade: Trends in the Mortality and Morbidity of Women, 
268 JAMA 3231, 3232 (1992). 
59
 See Rhoden, Trimesters, at 640 n. 9. 
60
 See Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure, __ (forthcoming) (describing symptoms 
and risks of pregnancy). 
61
 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
62
 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
63
 Id. at 72. The challenge in Vuitch was that the law’s reference to “health” was 
vague. 
64
 439 U.S. 379 (1979). 
65
 Id. at 400. 
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“merely desirable” in order to be used.66 The courts, along with the 
medical profession, was moving toward the view that the pregnant 
woman rather than the fetus was the patient.67 For the state to 
balance the woman’s health against “additional percentage points of 
fetal survival” raised “[s]erious ethical and constitutional 
difficulties.”68 
Casey’s ratification of the “substantial and irreversible 
impairment” standard was thus a significant retreat. The immediately 
apparent impact of that retreat, however, was cushioned by the nature 
of the challenge in that case. In Casey, the health exception was 
relevant only to post-viability abortions and to cases in which 
parental consent or a twenty-four hour waiting period would 
otherwise be required. A higher threshold of medical risk makes 
somewhat more sense in this context.69 Planned Parenthood 
implicitly conceded that a narrow health exception was acceptable by 
arguing only that the phrasing of the statute failed to cover particular 
conditions that were also substantial and irreversible. By loosely 
construing the statute, the Court was able to dismiss this challenge 
with the blithe reassurance that “significant threat[s]” would be 
covered. Because of this assurance, and because the health exception 
did not pertain to whether an adult woman could obtain a pre-
                                                 
66
 Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 
(1976). 
67
 See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d  1235 (D.C. 1990) (holding that district court 
erred in granting hospital’s petition for court-ordered cesarean based on statistical 
trade-offs regarding maternal and fetal survival). On the importance of allowing 
the individual to make such decisions, see ROTHMAN, at 193 (“We cannot know 
who will be right, but we do know that, inevitably, anyone making these decisions 
will sometimes be wrong. To me, it comes down not to whose judgment we trust, 
but whose mistakes. … Why, then, do I trust the idiosyncratic mistakes of parents? 
Precisely because they are idiosyncratic. The mistakes of medicine and those of the 
state are systematic, and that alone is reason not to trust.”); cf. Jennifer S. 
Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 462-65 
(2007) (discussing de-centralization of parenting decisions as a key reason for 
Fourteenth Amendment protection of parental rights). On the deterioration of 
respect for women’s autonomy in areas such as court-ordered c-sections as well as 
abortion, see Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and 
Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 COLO. L. REV. _, _ 
(forthcoming). 
68
 Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400. 
69
 See Rigel C. Oliveri, Crossing the Line: The Political and Moral Battle Over 
Late-Term Abortion, 10 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 397, 405 (1998) (arguing that the 
standard for abortion-related health concerns should vary over the course of 
pregnancy, as birth gradually becomes safer than abortion). 
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viability abortion, a woman still had the final say on any necessary 
trade-offs between herself and the fetus. 
Since Casey, the Court has not had to face hard questions about 
the scope of the health exception precisely because of the relatively 
unfettered right to choose abortion before viability. Viability occurs 
at roughly twenty-three to twenty-four weeks after the woman’s last 
menstrual period.70 After sixteen weeks, and certainly after twenty-
two, hard questions about the health exception are increasingly less 
likely to arise. The later in pregnancy an abortion occurs, the more 
likely it was a wanted or welcomed pregnancy. In those cases, the 
woman herself is likely to seek an abortion only after the onset of 
serious complications. Similarly, doctors are increasingly reluctant to 
perform abortions as pregnancy progresses, and in most cases 
delivery eventually becomes medically safer than abortion.71 The 
fact that the woman has the right to choose abortion for any reason 
before viability avoids the question of how much risk is necessary to 
trigger the health exception. The right to elective abortion has thus 
suspended much of the pre-Roe debate over the medial conditions 
that justify therapeutic abortion.72 
This hiatus would come to an end if the right to elective abortion 
were eliminated. Presumably, a woman would retain the right to an 
abortion when pregnancy endangered her life or health. The Supreme 
Court would then find itself thrust into a revival of the debate over 
what kind and magnitude of risk is necessary to invoke the 
constitutionally required health exception.73 Abortion opponents fear 
that “health” would be broadly defined to include, perhaps, not only 
                                                 
70
 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992). 
71
 See Rhoden, Trimesters, at 640 n. 9. 
72
 See, e.g., U.S. v. Vuitch 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (analyzing health exception for 
vagueness).  
73
 This debate remains alive in other countries with stricter limits on abortion. 
Where abortion opponents have reacted to perceived “abuse” of both health and 
life exceptions by banning all abortions, the result is that doctors have, in some 
cases, refused to treat a woman in the midst of miscarriage until they could confirm 
fetal death. In at least one documented case, doctors prolonged the delay by giving 
a woman drugs to stop her contractions, and she died from lack of  treatment. See 
MICHELLE GOLDBERG, THE MEANS OF REPRODUCTION: SEX, POWER, AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE WORLD 13 (2008). Even defenders of such laws, who say that 
refusal to treat a miscarriage is a mistake, suggest that, late in pregnancy, the 
doctor should save the baby at the woman’s expense if the baby has a better chance 
of survival. Id. at 30-31; cf. In re A.C., 573 A.2d  1235 (D.C. 1990) discussed 
supra note _. 
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slightly above-average physical risks but even the risks inherent in 
pregnancy or the mental distress of an unwanted pregnancy.74 
This fear is well-grounded in pre-Roe decisions about abortion. 
In Vuitch, the pre-Roe case challenging a health exception as vague, 
the Supreme Court read “health” to include mental health, “whether 
or not the patient had a previous history of mental defects.”75 The 
clear implication of the government’s concern with lack of prior 
diagnosis was that mental health was too malleable to limit a 
woman’s choice to abort. Indeed, in dissent Justice Douglas bore out 
the state’s concern by demonstrating that malleability: 
How likely must death be? Must death be certain if the 
abortion is not performed? Is it enough that the woman could 
not undergo birth without an ascertainably higher possibility 
of death than would normally be the case? What if the woman 
threatened suicide if the abortion was not performed? … Is it 
sufficient if having the child will shorten the life of the 
woman by a number of years? ... 
A doctor may well remove an appendix far in advance of 
rupture in order to prevent a risk that may never materialize. 
May he act in a similar way under this abortion statute? … 
Is any unwanted pregnancy a ‘health’ factor because it is a 
source of anxiety? … 
Would a doctor be violating the law if he performed an 
abortion because the added expense of another child in the 
family would drain its resources, leaving an anxious mother 
with an insufficient budget to buy nutritious food?76 
                                                 
74
 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[D]emanding a ‘health exception’—which requires the abortionst to assure 
himself that, in his expert medical judgment, this method is, in the case at hand, 
marginally safer than others …—is to give live-birth abortion free rein.”); Brian 
W. Clowes, The Role Of Maternal Deaths In The Abortion Debate, 13 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 327, 371 (1993) (“The potential for abuse of the term ‘mental 
health’ is even greater than misuse of the term ‘physical health’ where abortion is 
concerned. When a definite physical indication for abortion cannot be ascertained, 
it is a simple matter to use virtually any rationalization to justify an abortion for the 
mother's mental health.”).  Cf. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CONSTITUTION OF 
THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 1 (2006), 
http://www.who.int/entity/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf (“Health is a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity.”). 
75
 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72. 
76
 Id. at 75-76 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
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Justice Douglas concluded that “health” was infinitely malleable to 
fit the moral views of jurors and was therefore an unconstitutional 
standard.77 Should Roe/Casey be overruled, one of the next battles in 
the abortion wars will be a renewal of this debate over the scope of 
the health exception.78 
The Supreme Court has already begun laying the groundwork 
for a narrow health exception that forces women to bear the risks of 
normal pregnancy and at least some complications. In Gonzales v. 
Carhart (Carhart II),79 the Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act, which contains a life exception but not a health 
exception. The Act bans a particular method of surgical abortion. 
Surgical abortions are use in the second trimester, when about 10-15 
percent percent of all abortions in the United States are performed.80 
The most common procedure is called dilation and extraction, or 
D&E.81 In some cases, a doctor may keep the fetus intact (and living) 
until the end of the procedure in order to minimize the use of sharp 
instruments inside the uterus. This approach is called intact D&E.82 
Congress deemed in “partial birth” abortion, and it is banned by the 
Act. In Carhart II, the government justified the Act’s lack of health 
exception in part on the grounds that intact D&E is never safer than 
available alternatives; thus no health exception is needed. Never did 
the government explain why the statute nonetheless has a life 
exception—how could the procedure be necessary, in some cases, to 
save a woman’s life but never necessary to prevent injury short of 
death? 
The answer is that the Act’s proponents did not want minor 
health concerns—i.e., anything short of death—to be used to invoke 
                                                 
77
 Id.  
78
 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-51 
(1992) (suggesting that if Roe were overruled, the right to abortion might still exist 
“in those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own 
life or health, or is the result of rape or incest”). 
79
 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Carhart I was Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
In Carhart I, the Court struck down Nebraska’s ban on partial-birth abortion 
because the description of the prohibited procedure was vague and because of the 
lack of health exception. Carhart II concluded that Congress had cured any 
vagueness problems and that congressional findings were adequate to demonstrate 
that a health exception was unnecessary, at least for purposes of a facial challenge. 
Both decisions were 5 to 4. Justice O’Connor had voted with the majority in 
Carhart I. She retired and was replaced by Justice Alito, who voted with the 
majority in Carhart II. 
80
 See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 134. 
81
 Id. at 135. 
82
 Id. at 136, 161. 
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the health exception.83 To prevent such abuse, the Act places 
women’s lives but not their health above the government’s distaste 
for a particular abortion procedure. If Roe/Casey is overruled and 
abortion rights are limited to the health exception, Carhart II will be 
used to justify a high standard of medical risk that will substantially 
exceed the difference between the risks of normal pregnancy and the 
risks of early abortion. Only “significant threat[s]” to a woman’s 
health will be adequate to overcome her duty to the fetus and the 
state.84 Carhart II also establishes substantial deference to the 
legislature in assessing those risks contrary to medical opinions, let 
alone the pregnant woman’s opinion based on her own consideration 
of medical data and other factors.85 
In sum, the health exception is not intended to acknowledge that 
normal pregnancy itself is a substantial drain on a woman’s health. 
Indeed, that risk is obscured by the existence of a health exception 
distinct from the general Roe/Casey right to abortion. Bearing 
                                                 
83
 Testimony before Congress suggested that the Act’s proponents would have 
preferred to omit the life exception as well. See Oliveri, Crossing the Line, at 408-
09 (collecting examples from congressional testimony indicating that a good 
mother would sacrifice herself for her fetus) (“The argument seems to be that, as 
long as a maternal health problem poses no risk to the health of the fetus, the 
woman is seeking an ‘elective’ abortion if it is to save her own health.”); The Hope 
Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880-81 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, C.J., 
dissenting) (“These statutes … are concerned with making a statement in an 
ongoing war for public opinion, though an incidental effect may be to discourage 
some late-term abortions. The statement is that fetal life is more valuable than 
women's health.”), vacated, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000); cf. Reva 
Siegel, Concurring Opinion, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, at 78 
(quoting Eugene Quay, Justifiable Abortion, 49 GEO. L.J. 173, 234 (1961) : “A 
mother who would sacrifice the life of her unborn child for her own health is 
lacking in something. If there could be any authority to destroy an innocent life for 
social considerations, it would still be in the interests of society to sacrifice such a 
mother rather than the child who might otherwise prove to be normal and decent 
and an asset.”). 
84
 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 550 U.S. 833, 880 (1992). 
85
 The same derogation of women’s interest in, and control over, their own health 
is also evident in other, related areas of law. For example, under no circumstances 
will a court order that a parent be forced to submit to surgery—say to donate bone 
marrow—for the benefit of a born child. Yet courts seriously consider and 
sometimes grant petitions to force pregnant women to submit to surgery for the 
purported benefit of their fetuses. See generally Burkstrand-Reid, Invisible Woman 
at _; cf. Sylvia Law, Childbirth: An Opportunity for Choice That Should Be 
Supported, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 345 (2008) (discussing medical 
and non-medical factors a woman might consider in choosing between vaginal 
birth and scheduled c-section). 
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children is such a normalized aspect of what women are for that state 
imposition of the typical risks of pregnancy is inadequate to invoke a 
woman’s right to protect her bodily integrity. Something more is 
needed to demonstrate that this imposition is contrary to human 
rights. Enter equality. 
2.   The Good Samaritan Argument 
Because the Roe/Casey health exception is not meant to reach 
early abortion of a normal pregnancy, several commentators have 
developed more extensive moral arguments for a woman’s right not 
to carry the physical burden of the state’s claimed interest in 
potential life. These arguments apply to the physical burden of a 
typical pregnancy. Their main feature is an analogy between 
pregnancy and other situations in which the law declines to impose 
similar burdens. When presented in legal form, this analogy sounds 
in equal protection rather than privacy. This approach illustrates how 
equality principles can serve as a ratchet to broaden the law’s 
conception of fundamental rights to include women’s experiences. 
At the same time, the limits of the analogies illustrate some of the 
limits of the equality approach. 
The most famous of the body-focused argument is Judith Jarvitz 
Thomson’s A Defense of Abortion.86 Thomson’s essay presents an 
ethical case against requiring pregnant women to be Good 
Samaritans, even assuming that a fetus has the same moral status as a 
born person. Among several other analogies, Thomson asks us to 
consider a person’s rights and duties if she is kidnapped by the 
Society of Music Lovers and turned into a life support system for a 
famous violinist. The violinist can survive only if the kidnapping 
victim remains hooked up for nine months. Thomson argues that she 
has the right to unplug herself, even if doing so will cause the 
violinist’s death. Eileen McDonagh has translated Thomson’s ethical 
argument into legal terms.87 Going further than Thomson in some 
                                                 
86
 Judith Jarvitz Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). 
87
 See  EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK (1996). See 
also, e.g., Donald Reagan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979); 
Siegel, Reasoning, at 342 (observing that “selective regulation of women’s conduct 
is justified on the grounds that pregnant women have a unique physical capacity to 
harm children, when the regulation may in fact reflect the view that pregnant 
women have a unique social obligation to protect children”) (discussing forced 
cesareans, other medical interventions, and regulation and prosecution of women 
for fetal neglect). 
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respects, she argues that an unwillingly pregnant woman is a 
“Captive Samaritan” to whom the state owes a duty of rescue. 88 
The strength of Thomson’s violinist analogy lies in its demand 
that we contemplate the physical risks and burdens of pregnancy in a 
new context, where unconscious assumptions about the normalcy of 
pregnancy do not apply. Stripped of these assumptions, the health 
risks of pregnancy clearly exceed any burdens the law ordinarily 
imposes on unwilling individuals, even to further the state interest in 
the life of another.89 Translating this analogy into the language of 
equal protection, McDonagh makes a convincing case for an 
affirmative obligation on the part of the state to provide (and pay for) 
abortions, just as it pays for law enforcement to respond when one 
person attempts to capture and make use of the body of another. 
While a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion may be a legally 
justified “Bad Samaritan,” a woman who cannot afford an abortion is 
a “Captive Samaritan” to whom the state owes the same duty of 
rescue as other captives.90 
Another strength of the Good Samaritan argument is that it 
allows for the possibility that the fetus has substantial moral status, 
perhaps the same moral status as a born person, and shows why the 
right to abortion should nonetheless be protected. Most court 
decisions and commentary have incorrectly assumed that fetal or 
embryonic personhood would completely defeat the right to 
abortion.91 
                                                 
88
 See MCDONAGH, at 171-73. 
89
 Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Opinion Concurring in the Judgment Except as to Doe, in 
WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, at 119 (“As there are privileges of 
citizenship, so too there are duties, such as jury or military service. ... But we do 
not deal here with such public duties of citizenship. Rather, we deal with a law that 
would force a particular private life on particular private individuals....”). 
90
 See MCDONAGH, at 145, 171-73 
91
 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973) (“If this suggestion of 
personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ 
right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.”); Abele v. 
Markle, 341 F.Supp. 224, 228-29 (D. Conn. 1972) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine how 
a statute permitting abortion could be constitutional if the fetus had fourteenth 
amendment rights.”); but see id. at 228 (“If [the fetus] is [a person], then a 
legislature may well have some discretion to protect that right even at the expense 
of someone else's constitutional right.”) (emphasis added). See also Balkin, 
Original Meaning, at 339-40 and n. 127 (arguing that fetal personhood would 
imply that abortion could never be legal, except—after a hearing with appointed 
counsel for the fetus— to protect a pregnant woman from death or serious injury). 
Disagreement over whether fetal personhood completely defeats the right to 
abortion appears to reflect deep-seated assumptions about whether pregnancy is a 
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Despite these strengths, the Good Samaritan argument has not 
taken hold in either court decisions or popular discourse about 
abortion. This failure is due to three related layers of resistance to 
Thomson’s analogy. 
First is the entrenched naturalness of pregnancy and other 
caretaking as women’s social role. It is opponents, not advocates, of 
abortion who paint the right as a right to walk away from rendering 
life-saving aid to another. Legal doctrine reflects cultural 
assumptions when it refuses to see that abortion regulations are sex-
specific.92 In the absence of an impossibly precise analogy, 
background assumptions about the naturalness of female care work 
fill the gap of rationalizing a duty to carry a fetus to term. 
Second, an important strand of feminist thought resists the law’s 
embrace of Bad Samaritanism generally. Most feminists would 
object to a legal system that forces women but not men to provide 
care. Relational feminists, however, disagree with the Bad Samaritan 
principle that it is generally inappropriate for the law to demand 
caretaking.93 One feminist criticism of the Good Samaritan 
argument, then, is that it depends on embrace of the Bad Samaritan 
principle. It seems odd to ground a fundamental basis for women’s 
equality in a principle that is rejected by an important branch of 
feminism.94 
                                                                                                                 
passive or active state—i.e., whether making a baby rather than aborting is an act 
or an omission. 
92
 Under the logic of Geduldig, abortion laws are sex-neutral because they apply to 
anyone, regardless of sex, who is pregnant and seeks an abortion. See Geduldig v. 
Aillieo, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). While Geduldig’s future is uncertain, see Reva B. 
Siegel, You’ve Come A Long Way Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy 
Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1873 (2006) (arguing that Nev. 
Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), “introduces an important new 
understanding of” Geduldig); MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1322 (“In the pregnancy 
area, the notion that one must first be the same as a comparator before being 
entitled to equal treatment has been deeply undermined, although it remains 
constitutional precedent.”), the problem remains that there is no precise, realistic 
analog to pregnancy in male experience. 
93
 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 575, 580-81 (1993) (using relational feminist concepts to argue 
against the Bad Samaritan principle that a person has no duty to rescue a stranger 
in distress). 
94
 In a similar vein, Sylvia Law has objected that the Good Samaritan argument 
suggests that abortion is morally wrong even if legally defensible. See Law, 
Rethinking, at 1022. Thomson suggests the possibility that the law must refrain 
from requiring individuals to be Good Samaritans but might still require them to be 
Minimally Decent Samaritans. See Thomson, A Defense, at 63-64. 
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Third, the violinist analogy lacks resonance with women’s 
experiences of pregnancy, reproduction, and abortion. The physical 
burden of normal pregnancy is not what prompts most abortions.95 
Most women who want to have a child are willing to undergo 
pregnancy if they can; many women take great medical risks to bear 
children. In extreme cases this risk-taking probably reflects 
undesirable social conditioning toward a maternal imperative. But in 
recognizing the problem of the extreme we should not condemn the 
more typical case, in which reasonably healthy women willingly 
assume the medical risks of pregnancy.96 The Good Samaritan 
argument is thus unable to provide a convincing account of abortion 
rights as human rights for women, even if the argument ought to be 
doctrinally sufficient to call into question the constitutionality of 
abortion bans. 
The body-focused arguments—from the health exception to the 
Bad Samaritan principle—illustrate both the need for and the limits 
of equality arguments. The health exception has been carefully 
constructed as distinct from early elective abortion, maintaining the 
normalcy of pregnancy’s inherent risks. Women’s right to bodily 
integrity is thus defined narrowly even as the doctrine purports to 
protect it. The Good Samaritan argument steps in to reveal the extent 
of the burden thereby placed on women. In doing so, however, the 
Good Samaritan argument characterizes pregnancy and abortion in 
ways designed to maximize their similarity to men’s lives rather than 
their place in women’s lives. What makes both the health exception 
and the Good Samaritan argument incomplete is that the right to 
have an abortion is not just about bodily integrity and medical self-
defense. It is about the entire course of one’s life. Because of this 
omission, and perhaps because of the persistence of an idealized 
image of pregnancy, arguments that focus on the whole life’s course 
                                                 
95
 In a study published in 2005 examining the reasons that contributed to a 
woman’s choice to obtain an abortion, 74% of the respondents stated that “having 
a baby would dramatically change my life,” 73% of the respondents said that they 
couldn’t afford a baby, and 48% of the respondents didn’t “want to be a single 
mother or [were] having relationship problems.” Lawrence B. Finer, Lori F. 
Frohwirth, Lindsay A. Dauphinee, Susheela Singh & Ann M. Moore, Reasons U.S. 
Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON 
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110, 112 (2005). 
96
 The alternatives are either a dramatic reduction in population or a much more 
widespread market in babies, in which poor women bear all the risks of pregnancy 
and the sale of children through surrogacy contracts is normalized as a convenient 
and more rational way for a wealthy woman to have a child, rather than a last 
resort in the face of infertility. 
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rather than the nine months of pregnancy have become more 
prevalent in feminist thought, public discourse, and the Supreme 
Court’s own explanations for the abortion right. 
B. THE BURDENS OF MOTHERHOOD: AN INCOMPLETE 
ACCOUNT OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
Rather than comparing pregnancy to other physical invasions, 
burdens-of-motherhood arguments compare the social burdens of 
motherhood to the social burdens of fatherhood. This emphasis 
responds to the reality that the importance of abortion rights is not 
limited to the period of pregnancy. At the same time, however, the 
comparison distances abortion rights from the physical fact of 
pregnancy. 
Burdens-of-motherhood arguments have evolved over the years. 
They began in a relatively simple form that had its roots in the 
formal equality theory of second-wave legal feminism.97 Formal 
equality theory sees a path to equality in being like a man, in 
particular being free of caretaking responsibility for children. It at 
times reflects an implicit assumption that having children is 
incompatible with a woman’s professional advancement. Thus, 
equality in the public sphere depends on a right to abortion in 
private. 
More nuanced incarnations of this approach reject the 
assumption that children are inherently a hindrance to women’s 
equality in the public sphere. They blame socially enforced gender 
roles for pressuring women to sacrifice participation in the public 
sphere for the sake of caretaking. These arguments also contextualize 
the abortion right in women’s lived experiences of intersecting 
inequalities. In doing so, however, they detach the abortion right 
from women’s bodies and suggest that the right is contingent on the 
persistence of those inequalities. This form of equality argument is 
thus important for illuminating the operation of sex inequality in 
society, but it is incomplete as an account of reproductive freedom as 
a human right. 
1. Version One: Women in a Man’s World 
In the years after Roe, as abortion gained increasing political 
salience, the felt connection between abortion rights and sex equality 
                                                 
97
 See Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 57 (2002) 
(“By the time the second wave of the feminist movement reached the legal system, 
it was dominated by formal equality, a commitment to the equal treatment of 
individual men and women regardless of sex.”). 
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began to permeate legal discourse about abortion. In 1992, in Casey, 
the Supreme Court briefly recognized this connection in affirming 
what it called the “essential holding” of Roe.98 
The Court’s acknowledgement of equality concerns overlapped 
with its discussion of stare decisis. Casey argued that women had 
come to rely on the availability of abortion in planning their lives, 
particularly with respect to pursuing educational and other 
opportunities leading to greater participation in the public sphere: 
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, 
people have organized intimate relationships and made 
choices that define their views of themselves and their places 
in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the 
event that contraception should fail. The ability of women to 
participate equally in the economic and social life of the 
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their 
reproductive lives. …  
An entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe’s 
concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in 
society, and to make reproductive decisions ....99 
Casey also suggested that state prohibition of abortion might have 
more to do with controlling women than with protecting fetuses.100 
To the extent that these brief references can be read as an 
equality argument for abortion rights,101 the argument assumes 
incompatibility between motherhood and full participation in the 
public sphere. The Court cited correlations among women’s 
increased education, increased workforce participation, and reduced 
fertility, but it ignored the complexity of the relationships among 
those aspects of women’s lives and the importance of social policy in 
constraining the choices that women and mothers have. By taking the 
social structure as given, Casey’s vision of equality accepted the 
division of the world into separate spheres and merely gave women 
the option of being like men. It was an argument on behalf of the 
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 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
99
 Id. at 856, 860. 
100
 Id. at 852 (“Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, 
without more, upon its own vision of women’s role, however dominant that vision 
has been in the course of our history and culture.”). 
101
 See Daly, Reconsidering (arguing that Casey represented a shift from privacy 
toward equality).  
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atypical woman who seeks to pursue a male path, rather than a 
challenge to the gendered hierarchy itself.102 
Casey’s version of the equality argument is also class-specific, 
and even for well-off women it offers a false promise of equality. 
The women Casey envisioned were facing unwanted pregnancies as 
obstacles to college and more, not struggling to make ends meet on 
minimum wage or to care for the children they already had. They 
needed abortions because they had other opportunities to pursue.103 
Moreover, the men to whom they were implicitly compared are not 
without children, nor are their children all planned; women and men 
experience unplanned parenthood at the same rate. The difference is 
that, for the most part, the men have wives or other women who care 
for those children. There is thus some merit to the pro-life rejoinder 
that Casey’s version of equality promises women that they can be 
equal to men so long as they are willing to “slay their children in 
order to obtain equal access to the marketplace and the public 
square.”104 Women, but not men, must forgo or delay parenthood in 
order to succeed in the public sphere. Casey’s vision of abortion as a 
tool for equality questions neither the division of labor that makes 
motherhood but not fatherhood inconsistent with career success nor 
the structure of a public sphere that is hostile to caretaking demands. 
Outside the courts, most feminists have long rejected any such 
acceptance of separate spheres or of a public sphere designed to be 
hostile to dependency. 
Of course, the public sphere nonetheless persists in its current 
form, only somewhat less hostile to dependency than it was in 1973 
                                                 
102
 In that respect, Casey is consistent with the Court’s sex discrimination 
jurisprudence generally. See Law, Rethinking, at 981-82 (arguing that ACLU 
litigation strategy in sex cases perpetuated the disregard of difference). 
     The seeds of Casey’s equality approach can be found in Roe itself, which 
similarly presented “decisions about motherhood as a private dilemma to be 
resolved by the woman and her doctor: a ‘woman’s problem,’ in which the social 
organization of motherhood plays little part.” Siegel, Reasoning, at 273. This 
account “invites criticism of the abortion right as an instrument of feminine 
expedience … because it presents the burdens of motherhood as women’s destiny 
and dilemma—a condition for which no other social actor bears responsibility.” 
Id.,at 274. 
103
 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (citing data pertaining to fertility and college 
education). 
104
 Teresa Stanton Collett, Dissenting Opinion, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD 
HAVE SAID, at 194. 
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or 1992, and the private sphere remains neglected by men.105 Casey 
was thus factually correct that the availability of abortion is an 
important factor in women’s ability to pursue public careers. A 
broader vision of reproductive freedom, however, demands an 
abortion right that does not depend on structural sex inequality. Even 
in a perfect society, not every pregnancy will be planned. Moreover, 
there is a difference between unplanned and unwanted; there ought 
to be room for unplanned pregnancies to become wanted pregnancies 
without derailing the rest of life. Casey’s vision of women 
assimilating into a man’s world free of caretaking burdens does not 
allow for that space. 
2. Version Two: Women in a Sexist World 
The more nuanced version of this argument is exemplified by 
Jack Balkin’s recent Abortion and Original Meaning.106 Balkin 
attributes the incompatibility between motherhood and public 
participation to social pressure to conform to a particular vision of 
motherhood.107 He compares the burdens of motherhood to the 
burdens of fatherhood and finds socially imposed disparities.108 This 
comparison highlights the fact that the problem lies in society rather 
than biology. The comparison, however, suffers from its rejection of 
biology as one source of the problem. Defending abortion as a 
remedy for social inequality overlooks the fundamental nature of 
women’s need to control their reproductive lives, implies inherent 
limits on the right, and abstracts women’s bodies out of the 
discussion. It is an apology, rather than a moral justification, for 
abortion. 
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 See Karen Czapansky, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental 
Equity, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1415-16, 1435 (1991) (collecting statistics on 
men’s continuing non-participation in domestic work). 
106
 Balkin, Original Meaning. See also Siegel, Reasoning; MacKinnon, 
Reflections, at 1312-13 (“Social custom, pressure, exclusion from well-paying 
jobs, the structure of the marketplace, and lack of adequate daycare have exploited 
women's commitment to and caring for children and relegated women to this 
pursuit which is not even considered an occupation but an expression of the X 
chromosome.”); Colker, Equality Theory (critiquing several versions of the 
equality argument for abortion rights from an anti-essentialist perspective); Colker, 
An Equal Protection Analysis (arguing that society, rather than biology, puts the 
burdens of parenthood on women and that abortion restrictions should be attacked 
for their disparate impact on women, under a more stringent disparate impact 
standard than the one set out in Feeney). 
107
 See Balkin, Original Meaning, at 324. 
108
 See id. at 323-24. 
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First, attributing the burdens of motherhood to societal 
discrimination ignores many women’s experience of caretaking as an 
authentic choice. Casey appeared merely to assume that whenever a 
child was born that burden would fall on the mother. The more 
sophisticated versions of the argument agree but explain that 
phenomenon in terms of social pressure to conform to gender roles. 
This explanation requires too much false consciousness about the 
reasons mothers devote huge amounts of time, money, and energy to 
caring for their children. Without denying the social pressure on 
mothers, it is, first, a good thing that someone feels that level of 
responsibility towards children. Second, it is not unreasonable to 
think that even in our non-sexist future, women will feel 
disproportionately attached (relative to men) to their biological 
children, at least at the time of birth.109 The ability to act on that 
attachment without sacrificing material security or public life is as 
much a part of reproductive freedom as the right to abortion. 
Setting aside questions of causation—whether state action, 
societal discrimination, or authentic choice explains more of the 
disproportionate burdens of motherhood—why is abortion an 
appropriate remedy for women’s poverty and other inequality? 
Catharine MacKinnon argues, “Short of … equality … abortion has 
offered the only way out.”110 But it is a very narrow way. Everyone 
agrees, in theory, that if a woman wants to have a child but fears she 
cannot afford to care for it, alleviating her poverty would be 
preferable to merely pointing her to an abortion clinic.111 Pro-choice 
advocates are quick to point out that they, rather than their pro-life 
opponents, are more likely to support sex education, freely available 
contraception, health care, social welfare programs, and a family-
friendly public sphere.112 Accusing one’s opponent of hypocrisy, 
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 See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 473-82 (discussing surrogacy and 
reproductive technology). My claim is not that the bond between a biological 
mother and child is unequaled by other love between parents and children (or that 
the bond is always one of love) but that pregnancy is sufficient to create a 
cognizable parent-child relationship that will typically include emotional bonds).  
110
 MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1317. 
111
 Cf. West, Opinion Concurrin gin the Judgment, in WHAT ROE V. WADE 
SHOULD HAVE SAID, at 141 (“If there is a conflict between caring for one’s 
children and being a citizen in this Republic of choice, it is a conflict that will also 
burden mothers who enjoyed fully consensual, welcome pregnancies conceived in 
happy, consensual, joyful sex.”). 
112
 See, e.g., Colker, Equality Theory, at 107 (“Why are the states that refuse to 
increase funding for women and children under Medicaid also the states that 
restrict abortion substantially?”); Pollitt, supra (“So far as I can tell, [Feminists for 
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however, is not a response to the merits of her argument.113 The fact 
that abortion opponents have not offered better solutions to women’s 
poverty does not alter the grossness of the disparity between the 
problem and abortion as a remedy. Focusing on the inequalities that 
constrain women’s lives can explain why the right to abortion is 
sometimes an important means of asserting some control over a 
woman’s own life. But using abortion as a backstop to avoid the 
worst impositions of inequality does not provide a full justification of 
abortion as a human right regardless of the woman’s social 
condition. 
The emphasis on existing social inequality also suggests a built-
in sunset clause for abortion rights. If the right to abortion flows 
from society’s disproportionate expectations of mothers, then 
abortion rights will no longer be needed once the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
Life] is the only ‘prolife’ organization that talks about women’s rights to work and 
education and the need to make both more compatible with motherhood.”). 
113
 Consider this comparison. In Carhart II, the Supreme Court accepted a 
paternalistic, woman-protective rationale for banning what Congress deemed 
“partial-birth” abortions. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007). 
One of the Court’s reasons for protecting women from a particular abortion 
procedure was the supposition that women were not aware of how the procedure 
was performed. Banning the procedure protected a woman from trauma later on, 
when she learned “that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the 
fast-developing brain of her unborn child.” Id. at 160. While much of this 
reasoning was directed at the abortion decision itself, the opinion suggests that 
doctors were likely performing abortions without fully apprising women of what 
the procedure entails and offering a choice of method. Perhaps ordinary standards 
of informed consent were inadequate where the choice of procedure is reasonably 
understood to have moral as well as medical implications. 
The government’s and the Court’s response to this problem understandably 
infuriated feminists. In dissent, Justice Ginsburgh fulminated at the paternalism of 
responding to the absence of adequately informed consent by removing choice 
rather than providing information. See id. at 183-85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
Suppose, however, that rather than banning a particular procedure, Congress had 
imposed a heightened informed consent requirement. To ensure full consent to the 
abortion method, women were subjected to descriptions of abortion procedures like 
those found in the Carhart opinions. Feminists would surely object. They might 
propose a different solution, or argue that no change is needed. The feminist 
objection, however, would not mean that feminist outrage at the paternalism in the 
Court’s reasoning is any less justified. The Court’s argument is demeaning to 
women regardless of whether feminists have an alternative solution that the 
sponsors of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act would also find acceptable. 
The same is true for the question of abortion as a response to poverty or other 
systematic inequality suffered by women who might seek abortions. The 
availability of abortion is a “pathetically inadequate remedy” for a pregnant woman 
who lacks the material resources to rear a child. Robin West, Opinion Concurring 
in the Judgment, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, at 141. 
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concludes that sex equality is at hand. Many women in the U.S. 
already experience greater levels of equality and privilege than any 
other women in recorded history. The Supreme Court has already 
forecasted the end of structural race inequality within a generation; 
the practical end of sex inequality cannot be far behind.114  
Equality, of course, can be achieved by leveling up or by 
leveling down. A state could claim that women no longer “need” 
abortion either by improving women’s ability to control their 
sexuality and by supporting pregnancy and child-rearing (leveling 
up) or by imposing substantial sex- and child-related burdens on men 
(leveling down). In either case, the burdens-of-motherhood 
arguments suggest that greater infringement on women’s liberty 
would be justified. Indeed, some of the strongest advocates of 
women’s equality have suggested that greater restrictions on abortion 
would be warranted under conditions of sex equality.115 
An increasing number of liberal voices are also rising in support  
of the one kind of restriction on abortion that the Supreme Court has 
consistently struck down: spousal notification and consent 
requirements. Commentators who implicitly assume at least rough 
social equality between men and women are now beginning to see a 
biological and legal inequality in women’s favor. Men, in this view, 
are unfairly disadvantaged by their lack of control over pregnancy 
and the decision whether to abort. Proponents of this view have 
proposed remedies ranging from a due process-like right to notice of 
                                                 
114
 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 342-43 (2003) (predicting that affirmative 
action in higher education will not be needed after about twenty-five years). 
115
 See, e.g., Siegel, Reasoning, at 366-67 (stating that a state could justify forced 
pregnancy “by showing that the state does all in its power to promote the welfare 
of unborn life by noncoercive means …; by demonstrating that the sacrifices the 
state exacts of women on behalf of the unborn are in fact commensurate with those 
it exacts of men …; and even, by showing that the state is ready to compensate 
women for the impositions and opportunity costs of bearing a child they do not 
wish to raise”); MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1326-27 (“Under conditions of sex 
equality, I would personally be more interested in taking the man's view into 
account”); but see id. (“The issue of the pregnant woman's nine-month 
commitment and risk would remain, and might have to be dispositive. The privacy 
approach might make more sense.”). Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Prospective 
Abolition of Abortion: Abortion and the Constitution in 2047, 1 UNIV. OF ST. 
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51 (proposing a constitutional amendment banning 
abortion to take effect in forty years, although not conditioning this effect on any 
improvements in women’s status). 
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the pregnancy and an opportunity to be heard, to relieving men from 
child support obligations if they would have preferred an abortion.116 
If pregnancy and women’s liberty were adequately theorized, 
the prospect of more state control of abortion once equal liberty is 
declared would easily be recognized as a contradiction in terms.117 
The need for abortions would almost certainly decrease dramatically 
under conditions of sex equality, but the same cannot be said of the 
need for abortion rights.118 
Moreover, the combination of (1) poverty and inequality as a 
justification for abortion and (2) willingness to allow greater 
regulation when and where women enjoy greater equality is a 
potentially dangerous mix. Demographic panic in the United States 
and Europe today is reminiscent of the fears that motivated the 
criminalization of abortion in the first place. Conservatives have 
increasingly expressed concern that privileged women are failing to 
breed, while less privileged women are breeding too much.119 A 
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 See Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure (draft on file) (seeking a kind of 
equality by proposing that men should have to compensate women for the pain and 
suffering of pregnancy but that in exchange women should be required to notify 
and consult with biological fathers with regard to decisions about the pregnancy); 
Ethan J. Leib, A Man’s Right to Choose: Men deserve a voice in the abortion 
decision, 28 LEGAL TIMES 1 (Apr. 4, 2005) (arguing that a man who is not 
negligent with respect to conception should be able to avoid a child support 
obligation by requesting that the woman abort); cf. Czapansky, Volunteers and 
Draftees, at 1478-79 (arguing that mother should be required to notify father of 
birth, with judicial bypass available). 
117
 See Allen, The Fix, at 432 (“[I]f constitutional liberty does not include 
reproductive control, then a national citizenship … continues to mean something 
disturbingly different for male and female citizens.”); Hanigsberg, Homologizing, 
at 413 (“Would any of these suggestions [for supporting women] obviate the need 
for abortions? The answer is no. In countries with a social welfare net beyond the 
wildest dreams of Americans, women still need abortion as a way to manage their 
procreative lives.”); Colker, Equality Theory, at 109 (“And if legislatures regulated 
men’s lives more, would that make restrictions on women constitutional or not 
sex-based?”); see also Rubenfeld, Concurring, at 119 (distinguishing cases such as 
jury or military service because “we do not deal here with such public duties of 
citizenship. Rather, we deal with a law that would force a particular private life on 
particular private individuals.”). 
118
 President Obama’s efforts to bridge the divide in the abortion debate show the 
importance of maintaining the distinction between reducing the need for abortions 
and reducing the number of abortions by any available means. See generally Jon 
O’Brien, Reducing the Need for Abortion: Honest Effort or Ideological Dodge, 
CONSCIENCE: THE NEWSJOURNAL OF CATHOLIC OPINION (published by Catholics 
for Choice), at 13 (Summer 2009). 
119
 See GOLDBERG, MEANS OF REPRODUCTION, at 198-222 (discussing the “threat 
of first-world population decline that has, in recent years, come to obsess 
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theory that emphasizes social disadvantage as the primary 
justification for abortion, and allows for greater regulation when 
greater sex equality is present, is an invitation to regulate access to 
abortion in an essentially eugenic fashion. It is not hard to imagine, 
for example, that abortion decisions could be made by a 
governmental body under a generous “health” standard that permits 
or encourages abortion for poor women but rejects abortion requests 
from women with ample means to support a child. In other words, a 
sunset clause for reproductive rights is a bad idea in any event; even 
worse if the sunset looks different on the basis of race and class. 
Finally, disconnecting abortion rights from the body has 
implications for other doctrinal developments in the realm of privacy 
and reproductive rights. The focus on the social aspect of 
motherhood, rather than the biological, lends support to a generalized 
“right to avoid parenthood,” a right about which feminists should be 
cautious.120 To date, this right has been applied to enforce the wishes 
of a husband seeking to destroy frozen embryos over his wife’s 
protest.121  It also lends credibility to claims for a so-called “male 
right to abortion,” the claimed right to avoid child support 
obligations to an unintended child.122 When the right to abortion is 
premised largely on the post-birth consequences of motherhood, it is 
not entirely unreasonable to argue that it is unfair for women to have 
a clean-up period to avoid motherhood after pregnancy has begun, 
while sexual intercourse for men is a strict liability affair.123 Resting 
the right to abortion entirely on the social context of parenthood is an 
invitation to claims of equal rights for men. 
Burdens-of-motherhood arguments respond to the lived 
experiences of pregnancy and inequality that structure the 
circumstances under which many women seek abortions. By 
focusing on the social burden of motherhood as compared to 
fatherhood, however, they disconnect the abortion right from 
women’s bodies, instead constructing it as a right to avoid 
parenthood under conditions of inequality. This account of abortion 
rights is revealing and powerful in many circumstances, but it is 
                                                                                                                 
conservatives worldwide”); see also The Economist, Special Issue on Aging 
(2009). 
120
 See generally I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent, 81 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1115 (2008) (proposing a framework for distinguishing claims about the 
right not to be a gestational, genetic, or legal parent). 
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 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
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 See Leib, A Man’s Right to Choose; district court decision in South Dakota. 
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insufficient for a construction of women’s reproductive human rights 
that looks forward to the elimination of that inequality. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF 
PREGNANCY 
No one wants an abortion as she wants an ice-cream cone 
or a Porsche. She wants an abortion as an animal, caught 
in a trap, wants to gnaw off its own leg. 
—Frederica Mathewes-Green124 
Body-focused and burden-focused arguments for abortion rights 
both seek comparisons by emphasizing one aspect of pregnancy. The 
limits of both kinds of comparisons stem from the separation of the 
biological and social aspects of pregnancy. Body-focused 
comparisons highlight bodily integrity at the expense of the social 
context that is crucial in the decision to seek an abortion. Burdens-of-
motherhood comparisons emphasize that social context and the life-
changing burdens that motherhood entails. Yet, in order to make 
those burdens support an equality argument, they attribute women’s 
parenting decisions to negative forces in society. Moreover, severing 
the “right to avoid parenthood” from women’s bodies has 
undesirable implications. A better basis for equality arguments 
would respect pregnancy as a unitary process even while trying to 
draw analogies to other experiences. 
Such an approach is well grounded in existing precedent dealing 
with pregnancy outside the context of abortion. The Supreme Court 
has already treated pregnancy, in its biological and social aspects, as 
the foundation for constitutionally protected parental rights. Its 
approach has been criticized for essentializing women as mothers, 
and thus perhaps undermining the right to abortion. It holds the 
potential, however, for a more robust theory of reproductive rights 
that connects abortion to other concerns rather than isolating it. 
A pregnant woman has a right to abortion for the same reason 
she is the presumptive constitutional parent of any baby she carries 
to term: because pregnancy is physical caretaking and the archetype 
for creating a parental relationship. This unified understanding of 
pregnancy is a better basis for articulating women’s rights because it 
treats the female rather than the male experience as the norm. 
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A. PREGNANCY AND PARENTHOOD 
The harm of forced pregnancy should be understood in toto, as 
hijacking the body to force the creation of an intimate caretaking 
relationship. While the abortion right has been described in this way, 
the impulse to break it down into separate pieces remains because of 
the need to find male analogs for equality arguments. That process of 
disaggregation, however, takes us further away from an 
understanding of human dignity that is at home in female bodies. 
“Bearing a child creates a profoundly intimate relationship between 
the woman and the child, even when that relationship ends shortly 
after birth.”125 Forced pregnancy forces women into that intimate 
relationship regardless of whether society imposes too many 
expectations and disabilities on maternal status.  
Abortion rights are not the only context in which pregnancy is 
relevant to constitutional analysis. In an important line of cases 
dealing with the parental rights of unwed fathers, the Supreme Court 
used pregnancy as the model for defining constitutional status as a 
parent. The Court recognized that pregnancy combines biology and 
caretaking, and it based its equal protection analysis on a female 
baseline. The unwed father decisions thus provide a starting point for 
constitutional analysis of reproduction that defines rights with 
women’s unique experiences as the norm rather than the 
exception.126 
The unwed father cases involved a series of challenges to state 
laws that treated the mother but not the father as the legal parent of a 
child born outside of marriage.127 The Supreme Court started with 
the assumption that the biological mother’s parental rights were 
established by the birth of the child. The Court also accepted the 
state’s argument that biological fathers were not similarly situated to 
biological mothers: biological maternity implied a caretaking 
relationship to the child, which is not part of biological paternity.128 
Men were thus at a biological disadvantage when it came to parental 
rights.129 By analogy to cases such as Geduldig, where women were 
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 Law, Rethinking, at 1018.  
126
 For a more detailed elaboration of this point, see Hendricks, Essentially a 
Mother, at 433-444. 
127
 The main cases are Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); and  
Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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 See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 435-36. 
129
 Men are disadvantaged in that they are unable to become pregnant and give 
birth to a child. Cf. Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and 
HENDRICKS, BODY AND SOUL 
 
 
37 
 
biologically disadvantaged in the workplace, the conclusion should 
have been that the state could choose whether to accommodate men’s 
disadvantage by giving them parental rights. 
The Court, however, did not end its analysis with the 
observation that women and men are not similarly situated and 
therefore need not be treated the same. Instead, having identified a 
relevant biological difference between the sexes, the Court took 
another step: it used motherhood as the model for crafting a 
“biology-plus-relationship” test to accommodate fathers’ physical 
disadvantage. As the Court later explained, it makes sense to allow a 
man to acquire parental rights comparable to a mother’s by creating a 
test “in terms the male can fulfill.”130 Men’s biological disadvantage 
thus served not as a justification for different legal treatment but as 
the impetus for devising a legal standard that fairly accommodated 
their disadvantage. “[P]arental rights, the one area of law in which 
men’s biology rather than women’s is a disadvantage, is also the one 
area in which the Supreme Court has adopted a flexible, 
accommodating theory of sex equality” as a matter of constitutional 
command, not just governmental choice.131 
This vision of pregnancy as combining a biological relationship 
with a caretaking relationship fits comfortably at the intersection of 
the body-focused and burdens-of-motherhood arguments for abortion 
rights. Pregnancy itself, when unwanted, is both a bodily invasion 
and a social relationship of caretaking. It is precisely that 
combination that is at the heart of the harm of forced pregnancy, yet 
the combination is too often abandoned in the quest for a comparison 
to male experience. A better comparison would retain both elements, 
since it is the combination of biology and social relationship that 
                                                                                                                 
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. 
REV. 297, 303 (1990) (noting the “disadvantage [that] men experience in accessing 
child-nurturing opportunities”). 
130
 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (describing Congress’s effort to give 
male citizens means to obtain citizenship for foreign-born children). See also Mary 
L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender 
Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 88-90 
(1995) (stating that the model parent is a pregnant woman but that the “different 
biological roles of men and women in human reproduction make it imperative that 
law and public policy ‘recognize that a father and a mother must be permitted to 
demonstrate commitment to their child in different ways’”) (quoting Recent 
Developments: Family Law—Unwed Fathers’ Rights—New York Court of Appeals 
Mandates Veto Power Over Newborn’s Adoption for Unwed Father Who 
Demonstrates Parental Responsibility, 104 HARV. L. REV. 800, 807 (1991). 
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makes pregnancy uniquely challenging to analyze using legal 
principles based on the experiences of “non-pregnant persons.”132 
B. PREGNANCY AS PARENTING: A DANGEROUS PATH? 
The biology-plus-relationship understanding of pregnancy unites 
the bodily and social aspects of motherhood in a woman-centered 
definition of parenthood. That model of parenthood is well-suited to 
describe the harm of forced pregnancy. Nonetheless, there is cause to 
be concerned about the implications for abortion rights of describing 
pregnancy as a form of parental relationship. Opponents of 
reproductive rights use a similar conception of pregnancy to suggest 
that the natural order of biology implies a woman’s duty to bear 
children.133 That implication, however, depends on transforming an 
ability into a duty. Properly understood, the biological caretaking 
model of pregnancy supports the right to abortion as part of a 
comprehensive theory of reproductive freedom. 
1. Abortion and Mothering 
The description of pregnancy as a caretaking, parental 
relationship sounds alarm bells for many feminists. The capacity for 
pregnancy has long been the basis for extrapolating general duties of 
uncompensated care work by women, as well as condemnation of 
women who seek abortions. Both liberals and conservatives on the 
Supreme Court have at times reacted to that concern by going to the 
opposite extreme, denying that pregnancy has relational 
significance.134 Commentators have warned of the dangers of 
relational feminist theories that emphasize women’s connectedness 
to others.135 Feminist theory that portrays women as inherently more 
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 Geduldig v. Aillieo, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n. 20 (1974). More accurately, it is the 
experiences not only of the currently non-pregnant but of those who will never be 
pregnant and whose social identity is not defined largely by the possibility, 
regardless of the probability, of pregnancy. See generally Int’l Union v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that employer violated Title VII when 
it barred all fertile women from a job that involved exposure to lead). 
133
 See Siegel, Reasoning, at 265-80 (discussing the “physiological” reasoning 
behind the criminalization of abortion). 
134
 See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 468-71 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s 
recent insistence on the maternal-paternal equivalence at the moment of birth); 
ROTHMAN, at 248-49 (“[B]oth patriarchal ideology and liberal feminist thinking 
have come to the same conclusion about what to do with the problem of the 
uniqueness of pregnancy: devalue it. … Instead of a flower pot, the woman is seen 
as an equal contributor of seed—and the baby might just as well have grown in the 
backyard.”). 
135
 See Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational 
Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 
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nurturing than men can easily be used against feminist political 
goals. 
The model of pregnancy I have described is not based on the 
tenets of relational feminism. Relational feminists are correct, 
however, that pregnancy and birth are occasions of heightened 
connection to another life. While the capacity for pregnancy does not 
imply that women have a nurturing essence, pregnancy is an act of 
nurturance: the feeding and care of a developing life. That nurturing 
may be done with love, indifference, or hate, but it is done, and is 
thus analogous to the relationship prong of the biology-plus-
relationship test for unwed fathers.136 
The unwed father cases recognized that a history of nurturing 
gives rise to an emotional bond that is both worthy of respect and 
indicative of future willingness to provide care. This result is at least 
as plausible as a consequence of pregnancy. Specifically, it is 
plausible that pregnancy and childbirth will induce a woman to 
respond to the child in ways that make her likely to be a better 
caretaker and decision-maker than a person who lacks such a bond 
with the child.  
Of course, just because such a bond might seem natural does not 
necessarily mean it should have legal significance. “Nature,” after 
all, “is what we were put on this earth to rise above.”137 Much of our 
legal and social structure is devoted to suppressing what appear to be 
natural impulses. The thrust of equal protection jurisprudence has 
been to reject legal rules premised on claims about natural sex 
differences.138 The point of the comparison to the unwed father 
                                                                                                                 
858 (1993); see also Hanigsberg, Homologizing, at 380, 410 (noting that concerns 
about the implications of acknowledging a maternal relationship with the fetus 
have constrained feminist discourse about abortion). In law, relational feminism is 
typically a critique of autonomy-oriented, rights-centered discourse that ignores or 
discounts relationships and dependency. That critique is described as feminist on 
the basis of a series of claims about sex differences. Women are said to feel more 
connected to other people and to be more sensitive to relationships, as compared to 
men. 
136
 Cf. Hanigsberg, Homologizing, at 385 (“The argument that pregnancy is unique, 
however, should neither devalue nor sentimentalize it.”). 
137
 Rose Sayer (Katherine Hepburn) to Charlie Allnut (Humphrey Bogart) in The 
African Queen (United Artists 1951). See generally Brian Leiter & Michael 
Weisberg, Why Evolutionary Biology is (So Far) Irrelevant to Legal Regulation, _ 
L. & PHIL. _ (forthcoming). 
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 See, e.g., U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 546-556 (1986) (rejecting a plan to 
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cases, however, is not that women are any more inherently nurturing 
than men are. The unwed father cases reflect a social judgment that it 
is normatively good to recognize and promote a bond based on 
biological connection and a history of caretaking. Recognition of a 
similar bond created by pregnancy does not imply that pregnancy has 
unique status as the ultimate form of caregiving or that only pregnant 
and birthing women can achieve such a bond with a child.139 Rather, 
pregnancy is a form of caretaking that is at least comparable to the 
relationships recognized in the unwed father cases, relationships that 
routinely form between children and their caretakers beyond their 
birth mothers.140 Fear of traditional ideology—or the excesses of 
relational feminism—should not lead to discounting pregnancy, 
especially as compared to other forms of parental relationships.141 
2. Abortion Decisions as Parental Decisions 
The relationship model of pregnancy needs to be incorporated 
into the feminist discourse on abortion. Most arguments for abortion 
rights emphasize the weight of the woman’s interest. Only the Good 
Samaritan arguments directly address the implications of fetal life. 
This Article assumes that a vigorous defense of abortion rights can 
still value fetal life, as many pregnant women do. There is much to 
be gained from recognizing the moral status of pregnancy as a 
parental relationship. Abortion is always a decision about 
parenthood, but sometimes it is also a parenting decision. The 
comparative rights discourse about abortion too often leaves 
feminists without a framework for talking about abortion as part of 
parenting. Abortion rights are better understood by connecting them 
to parenting.142 
                                                                                                                 
academy” designed for what the state claimed were women’s typical educational 
needs). 
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 See ROTHMAN, at 242 (“[The relationship theory of pregnancy] does not mean 
that the maternal relationship cannot be ended. Nor does it mean that the 
relationship is the most overwhelming, all-powerful relationship on earth.”). 
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 See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 473-75; see also Law, Rethinking, at 
1007 (arguing that refusal to acknowledge the special relationship of pregnancy 
means that women can only be equal to the extent they are the same as men). 
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 Cf. MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1305 (“The dissent [in Michael M v. Superior 
Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), the statutory rape case,] revealed more concern with 
avoiding the stereotyping attendant to the ideological message the law 
communicated than with changing the facts that make the stereotype largely 
true.”); Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 470-71 (criticizing opinions in Nguyen 
v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), for denying reality for the sake of superficial formal 
equality). 
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 See Hanigsberg, Homologizing, at 390. 
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That the abortion decision can be a parenting decision is most 
readily apparent in the context of the ban on intact D&E abortions. 
The Supreme Court struck down Nebraska’s ban in Stenberg v. 
Carhart (Carhart I).143 In addition to vagueness problems, the statute 
was unconstitutional because it had no health exception, even though 
“a substantial body of medical opinion” held that intact D&E was 
sometimes safer.144 Seven years later, however, the Court handed 
down Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II),145 discussed earlier in this 
Article. Justice O’Connor having been replaced with Justice Alito, 
the Court in Carhart II upheld the federal ban with no health 
exception. 
An unacknowledged tragedy of Carhart II was that many of the 
abortions to which the law applies are abortions of wanted 
pregnancies. The “partial birth” procedure was used only in 
relatively late abortions. In some cases, these would be pre-viability 
abortions sought primarily because lack of health services delayed a 
woman’s knowledge of her pregnancy or access to abortion. In other 
pre-viability cases, and in all post-viability cases, the abortion is 
triggered by fetal deformities or by a threat to the pregnant woman’s 
life or health.146 The patient receiving a “partial birth” abortion may 
be a woman who has already picked out names, arranged for 
maternity leave, or had a baby shower. She has suddenly been faced 
with the prospect of her own possible death or disability, or of giving 
birth to a child who would know little but suffering in its short life. 
A woman planning an abortion in such circumstances faces 
additional decisions regarding the method of abortion. In some cases, 
the doctor can induce contractions, performing an abortion by 
triggering a miscarriage. Of the surgical options, the traditional D&E 
is legal, while the intact D&E is now illegal. There is no clear 
medical distinction between the two procedures, and the legal 
distinction is based primarily on Congress and the Supreme Court’s 
purported disgust for intact D&E. 
While medical exigencies may favor one method of abortion 
over others, they are not the only relevant factors. Many women may 
prefer an abortion by induction, tracking to some degree the birth 
                                                 
143
 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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 Id. at 937-38. 
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 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
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 See id. at 173 n. 3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the reasons that women 
seek abortions in the second trimester); MAUREEN PAUL, ET AL., A CLINICIAN’S 
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they had been anticipating, albeit with a tragic end. This procedure, 
when medically possible, may allow the woman to see and hold the 
intact fetus. Other women may want to avoid the resemblance to 
birth. The intact D&E avoids the physical and emotional toll of 
prolonged labor while also preserving the fetus intact.147 Women 
may also come to different conclusions than Congress about the 
relative morality of regular and intact D&E.148 
The sympathy evoked by this example need not be reserved for 
women reluctantly aborting welcomed pregnancies because of 
complications. A woman who needs a second trimester abortion 
because poverty or youth delayed her action is entitled to the same 
presumption that she is capable of making her own moral choice. 
The very factors that delayed her decision may also be the ones that 
make the abortion necessary. Her decision is no less parental, and her 
moral reasoning no less able to account for fetal life, because she had 
not meant to become a parent.149 
In Carhart II, the Court accepted Congress’s characterization of 
the intact D&E on the grounds that it “perverts” the natural birth 
process.150 Yet the Act’s proponents pointed to induction of labor as 
the morally superior method for necessary late abortions.151 
Apparently, the “natural birth process” is not when a woman labors 
to push out a baby but when a doctor uses instruments to extract a 
fetus from a uterus.152 
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 See MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1318 (stating that a woman’s decision to have 
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This perspective on the natural birth process is, at best, a 
medical one. One of the problems with both Carhart I and Carhart II 
is that the party challenging the ban was not a woman claiming her 
status as a moral actor but a doctor claiming his right to practice 
medicine as he saw fit. His advocates pinned their arguments on the 
doctor’s expertise rather than women’s moral status. In Carhart I, 
Justice Kennedy complained that the majority reasoned entirely from 
the perspective of the doctor, rather than the perspective of a 
“shocked” society.153 He was right. To the question “who decides” 
on the method of abortion, half the Court sided with the doctor, half 
with society, and no one with the pregnant woman. Not until Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent in Carhart II was there any suggestion that she 
might be an appropriate decision-maker. 
The choice of abortion method is not only medical but also 
moral and emotional. It is the sort of choice that adults make for 
themselves and that parents make for their children. The moral and 
emotional status of the woman/mother, however, were submerged by 
both sides in Carhart I and Carhart II. Recognizing the moral, 
parental aspect of the entire abortion decision, including the method, 
would not necessarily change the outcome of Carhart II. The 
Supreme Court has already held, in Washington v. Glucksburg,154 
that the state may inflict intimate suffering to further its moral 
interest in preserving life.155 But a model of pregnancy as parenting 
would help redress the prevailing assumption of frivolity that 
attaches to women’s abortion decisions.156 
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IV.  THE DIALECTIC OF EQUALITY 
Had women participated equally in designing laws, we might 
now be trying to compare other relationships—employer and 
employee, partners in a business, oil in the ground, termites 
in a building, tumors in a body, ailing famous violinists and 
abducted hostages forced to sustain them—to the 
maternal/fetal relationship rather than the reverse. 
—Catharine MacKinnon157 
The comparison-based equality arguments discussed in Part II 
are incomplete because they are single dimensional. Each gives only 
a partial view of how forced pregnancy diminishes human dignity. 
This partiality is a function of the search for a basis for comparison 
to male experience on which to ground an equal protection analysis. 
Pregnancy instead should be analyzed on its own terms, as a 
biological and social process. As discussed in Part III, the Supreme 
Court has already moved in that direction in the context of parental 
rights. This Part explores some possibilities for analogizing to a 
unified experience of pregnancy. It then suggests how such 
arguments could support claims for an affirmative right to 
reproductive freedom. Finally, it reflects on the limits of comparison-
based equality arguments when what is really at stake is women’s 
liberty. 
A. UNITARY COMPARISONS 
The burdens of motherhood argument criticizes society for 
forcing women to “become mothers” by imposing disproportionate 
responsibility for taking care of children after they are born. A more 
unified perspective on pregnancy and birth is that pregnant women 
have already become mothers—in the social as well as biological 
sense—by the time they give birth. Regardless of pressures from 
society as a whole, the law does not force men to become fathers in 
the same sense. Forced pregnancy can thus usefully be compared to 
the types of parenting duties that family courts will and will not 
require the parents of born children to perform. A second 
comparison, which more thoroughly integrates the physical and the 
social, is to a different kind of intimate relationship: one that may 
arise when a person is held physically hostage to the needs of 
another. 
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 1. Mandatory Visitation 
While legal parenthood of a born child triggers a duty of 
financial support, courts are loathe to impose a physical caretaking 
burden on parents other than pregnant women. Through child support 
requirements, the state forces only liability, not parenthood, onto 
noncustodial parents. Visitation, and the caretaking relationship it 
implies, is considered a right, not a duty.158 Faced with custodial 
parents’ requests that another parent be required to take advantage of 
visitation rights, courts have recoiled: “A court simply cannot order a 
parent to love his or her children, or to maintain a meaningful 
relationship with them.”159 While the law imposes child support 
obligations based on a tort-like notion of causation, it does not force 
noncustodial parents to engage in the caretaking work that is likely to 
produce an emotional bond. 
The mandatory visitation analogy improves on the burdens-of-
motherhood arguments because it draws a comparison between 
forcing pregnancy and forcing a post-birth relationship with a child. 
It also reveals a core shortcoming of the “male abortion” argument 
focused on child support,160 which misses the difference between a 
forced relationship and financial liability. This analogy suffers, 
however, from some of the same flaws previously discussed. It 
requires one to embrace the questionable premise that a person has 
no legal duty to provide direct care for his or her child. In addition, 
although the prospect of forced visitation raises a specter of physical 
coercion, it is not comparable to the invasion of bodily integrity 
involved in forced pregnancy. 
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sentiments of love or duty that characteristically arise, to keep and raise her 
child.”). 
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 See Pollack & Mason, at 78 (quoting Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. 2-00-005 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2001); see also Anita L. Allen, Opinion Concurring in the Judgment, in 
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To bring the body back into play, one could turn to the oft-cited 
example of organ donation or other medical procedure. No court or 
legislature in the United States has ever ordered a parent to submit to 
a medical procedure for the benefit of a born child. Yet they have so 
ordered pregnant women for the benefit of fetuses, both through 
abortion bans that mandate childbirth and through court-ordered 
cesareans and other surgery.161 These comparisons, however, lack 
the social element of pregnancy—even forced organ donation to a 
child would not impose the intimate caretaking relationship of 
pregnancy. The offense lies in the invasion of bodily integrity, again 
neglecting the social aspect that is an important part of the right to 
abortion. 
2. Stockholm Syndrome 
A better analogy may be to supplement Thomson’s violinist 
analogy with more information about the likely non-physical effects 
on the person serving as the violinist’s life-support system. In a 
psychological phenomenon known as Stockholm Syndrome, people 
who find themselves physically hostage to the interests of another 
have been known to identify and sympathize with those interests.162 
During the period of physical risk, this phenomenon is considered a 
natural, adaptive method for surviving and for coping 
psychologically with the captive state.163 Forced pregnancy creates 
analogous conditions. The pregnant woman is physically hijacked to 
serve the interests of the state, which purports to be acting on behalf 
of the fetus. This circumstance forces her to develop a psychological 
posture toward the fetus and the eventual child.164 Our violinist’s 
life-support system is thus not merely physically kidnapped for nine 
months’ service. She is put in a position in which it is likely that she 
will identify with, care for, and develop a long-term emotional bond 
with the violinist.165 For the involuntarily pregnant woman, that 
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 See Burkstrand-Reid, Invisible Woman, at _. 
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 See THOMAS STRENTZ, PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CRISIS NEGOTIATION 243-
245 (2006). 
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 See id., at 245-46. 
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 See Siegel, Reasoning, at 371- 72 (stating that a woman forced to carry a 
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child that are far greater than any she might have to an embryo/fetus”). Siegel 
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expect” this result. Id. 
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adaptation to the captive state is reinforced by personal beliefs and 
social norms about motherhood. If she is prevented from having an 
abortion, it is preferable—not diagnosable as a “syndrome”—that 
she develop a positive identification with the child, whether to rear 
herself or to find a different home. 
This analogy also provides a useful example of the need to 
distinguish what is natural from what is desirable. A hostage’s 
identification with her captors is natural in that it is recognized as a 
normal, adaptive psychological response to physical captivity. The 
response is adaptive in that it may actually increase the odds of 
survival. “Natural,” however, does not mean “inevitable”: many 
hostages do not experience Stockholm Syndrome. Moreover, once 
the period of captivity is over, the response is no longer considered 
desirable. To the contrary, it becomes a “syndrome” in need of 
treatment. 
With pregnancy, the social response is reversed: even after the 
period of physical “captivity,” society usually favors and promotes 
the mother’s identification with the infant’s needs.166 As I have said, 
I agree with that societal preference; it bears emphasizing that this 
analogy does not imply that a pregnant woman’s attachment to a 
fetus or infant is a pathology. A woman seeking an abortion, 
however, can be understood as analogous to a hostage seeking to 
avoid the development of an attachment analogous to Stockholm 
Syndrome. This analogy shows why the relationship theory of 
pregnancy is consistent with a right to abortion: “When a woman 
chooses abortion, she is choosing not to enter into a maternal 
relationship. Women want access to safe abortions as quickly as 
possible, before quickening, before a relationship can begin.”167 The 
harm of forced pregnancy is not only the physical invasion evoked 
by Thomson’s violinist analogy but also the creation of a strong 
emotional relationship of identification. 
Neither mandatory visitation nor the Stockholm Syndrome is, of 
course, a perfect or even a very good analogy to pregnancy. They 
have the advantage, however, of combining the physical and the 
social aspects of pregnancy. They are therefore somewhat truer to the 
experience of pregnancy than analogies that focus more exclusively 
on the body or exclusively on social relationships. These two 
analogies are also consistent with the Supreme Court’s use of 
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pregnancy as archetypal parenthood in the unwed father cases. This 
resonance creates opportunities for developing a broader based 
constitutional vision of reproductive freedom. 
B. AFFIRMATIVE RIGHTS 
 The unattained holy grail of abortion rights lawyering after Roe 
was public funding of abortions for poor women. As the nation 
lurches slowly toward universal health care, and as higher income 
women gain better contraceptive care (and thus less need for 
abortion), it becomes increasingly important to define the full-range 
of reproductive health services  as basic health care for women. 
Specifically, the exclusion of abortion and other reproductive health 
care from public health plans needs to be understood in a way that 
triggers heightened scrutiny, both as a sex classification and as 
implicating fundamental rights. 
Even in the heyday of strict scrutiny for abortion restrictions, the 
Supreme Court rejected all efforts to secure such funding and upheld 
the specific exclusion of abortion services from Medicaid.168 Under 
privacy doctrine, the government’s duty was merely to refrain from 
interfering when a woman privately sought a doctor to perform an 
abortion. Just as the freedom of speech does not mean that the 
government must give a person a megaphone, the right to have an 
abortion did not include the right to government assistance in 
procuring one.169 
The rejection of public funding was perceived to be a limit of 
privacy doctrine, and many feminist lawyers believed that the Equal 
Protection Clause would be a better path to funding.170 The state 
action problem, however, remains. One problem with the equality 
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arguments discussed in Part II—and with any equality argument for 
public funding of poor women’s abortions—was that they assume a 
governmental duty to accommodate de facto inequality. Under the 
burdens-of-motherhood approach, for example, women have a right 
to abortion because women are disproportionately and 
discriminatorily saddled with responsibility for rearing children.171 
That discrimination, however, is not attributable to the government 
under the state action doctrine.172 Existing inequality in biology and 
in social circumstances typically means that the government may 
choose whether to level the playing field by, say, giving women 
access to abortion.173 
The unwed father cases, however, provide an opening for a 
possible affirmative duty on the part of the government. A unified 
vision of pregnancy brings abortion rights within the ambit of those 
cases. The abortion right is closely related to the right at stake in the 
unwed father cases, since abortion involves the parent-child 
relationship as well as bodily integrity.174 In the fatherhood cases, the 
state was required to accommodate biological sex inequality when it 
acted to deny putative fathers of their liberty interest in the parent-
child relationship.  When the state restricts abortion, it also denies a 
liberty interest, and might similarly be required to accommodate de 
facto inequality in the context of reproductive rights. 
C. THE LIMITS OF EQUALITY 
None of the equality arguments I have either criticized or 
proposed rests on a perfect analogy between pregnancy and some 
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other life experience. Pregnancy is unique, yet equality analysis 
demands a comparison. If women’s unique fundamental rights have 
been unrecognized, then one way to bring them into view is to make 
them similar to experiences men could have. Finding a comparator is 
difficult with an event so unique and so socially fraught as pregnancy 
and birth. 
Equality and equal protection mean, at a minimum, treating 
“like things alike.” For a long time, the Supreme Court has added 
“… and different things however you want.” Feminists have worked 
hard to argue that the rule should instead be “like things alike, and 
different things in appropriately different ways.” The difficulty is 
that equality is an empty concept.175 To know what it means to treat 
women equally with men in the context of reproduction, one needs to 
have a substantive idea of what human dignity looks like for women. 
The equality arguments for abortion try to defend abortion rights 
by taking pieces of the problem and analogizing to general (male) 
experience. One might think that a series of partial views could 
eventually paint a picture of the whole, as with the blind men and the 
elephant. In this case, however, the whole is being constructed not 
merely from partial views but from partial views transformed by 
analogy into something else. When we break the elephant into pieces 
and subject them to this transformation, we could end up with a 
giraffe. The flaws in the various equality arguments are thus deeper 
than mere incompleteness. Each reveals an important aspect of the 
problem, but the forced comparison to male experience also channels 
how pregnancy and abortion themselves are understood. 
One feature of analogies that seek to convey the harm of 
unwanted pregnancy and motherhood is that they understandably 
tend to portray pregnancy and motherhood in a negative light. That 
might not be so bad; the point, after all, is that forced pregnancy is 
bad. All of these arguments, however, create a context in which only 
abortion is a protected right, at the expense of a broader conception 
of reproductive freedom. For example, many of the equality 
arguments were specifically designed to attack funding restrictions. 
These arguments do a good job of showing why it is sex biased for a 
state health care program to pay for the expenses of childbirth but not 
the expenses of abortion. They may even convince you that it is sex-
biased to rescue kidnapping victims but refuse to rescue involuntarily 
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pregnant women.176 Unfortunately, they are poorly suited to 
demonstrate why the reverse—say, funding abortion but not 
childbirth—would be equally horrid. Equality is not merely empty 
but in some ways a risky as a method for theorizing women’s basic 
human rights with respect to reproductive freedom. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Equality analysis yields valuable insights into the state’s 
willingness to force women to bear children and the role that policy 
plays in maintaining inequalities. Equality analysis, however, 
requires comparison, which in turn requires reframing pregnancy, 
abortion, and motherhood in ways that are comparable to male 
experiences. Often, the analysis proceeds by splitting apart the 
biological and social components of pregnancy. This initial step 
channels the discussion further and further from the reality of 
pregnancy, in which those components are inextricably intertwined, 
producing a rights discourse that remains rooted in men’s 
experiences even as it speaks the language of sex equality. 
The pitfalls of both the body-focused and the burdens-of-
motherhood equality arguments teach two lessons for constructing a 
feminist theory of reproductive freedom. First, feminists should 
avoid bifurcating pregnancy into physical and social components. 
The right to abortion is unitary and rests not on two distinct freedoms 
but on their inseparability. Any comparative analysis should include 
both aspects, or, if focused on just one, acknowledge its 
incompleteness. Second, equality analysis in this context should be 
undertaken as a method for revealing the legal system’s omission of 
women’s concerns, not as the final stage of defining the scope of 
reproductive human rights. The risk of mistaking the strategy for the 
goal is that women’s rights will continue to be defined as derivative 
of what the law has already deemed fundamental for men. 
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